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ABSTRACT:
The emergence of specialty service lines in the United States health care system presents many
significant questions regarding the access to, provision of, and financing of healthcare. In
general terms, specialty service lines represent the newest development in several important
trends in the American hospital system and reflect important trends in the wider economy.
Many claims have been made regarding the effect of physician-owned specialty hospitals, from
their exemption from self-referral prohibitions, their diversion of services away from general
hospitals that use high profit margins to subsidize the “safety net,” and concerns regarding the
over-provision of technologically complex treatments in a system already heavily weighted in
favor of specialized medicine. This study will examine the claims made about the differences of
physician-owned specialty heart hospitals serving Medicare patients. In doing so, it will employ
hierarchical linear modeling, the results of which indicate that specialty service lines may not
deliver higher quality care at a lower cost when compared to their general hospital competitors.
Rather, there are several significant factors in the hospital market, health insurance market, and
demographic features of the population that both groups serve that may have even more
notable effects. Because of these complications, this study finally shows the possibility for a
dialectical movement resulting from the inadequacies of the argument up to that point,
implying further avenues of research on the social character of the commodity of healthcare.
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Introduction

The history of the American health care system has focused on localized and specialized
care. While some managed care organizations (MCOs) have attempted to create regionalized
models that restrict the availability of specialized services in a geographic region, these attempts
have been isolated, and the dominant trend has been quite different. As fully risk-based
managed care has almost disappeared from the health insurance market, the portion of GDP
devoted to health care and the number of providers and facilities as grown significantly. One
emerging trend is physician ownership in facilities devoted to the treatment of a single
condition. Whether these facilities are small independent practices, floors or departments
within larger hospitals, or entire free-standing hospitals, they are referred to as specialty service
lines. These specialty service lines have come under some scrutiny in recent years for several
reasons. While the impact of specialty service lines on the cost of health care and the
relationship between specialty hospitals and managed care markets is unclear, it does seem to
be apparent that the American health care system is returning to an older dynamic, wherein
hospitals and physicians work together closely, sharing in the costs and profits of caring for
patients.
Specialty service lines have existed for years in the American health care system. One
recent development, however, is the ownership of these lines in whole or in part by individual
physicians or physician groups. This development is concerning because it has the potential for
the physician owners of the hospital to refer or prescribe services based on their own profitmaximizing desires rather than on high-quality, effective medical care in the patients’ best

interests. Another important aspect of specialty hospitals is their effect on prices of health care.
Those who study historical market organization in health care provision know the disastrous
effects the “medical arms race” had on health care prices. As certain hospitals gained more
specialized services, all of its neighboring hospitals had to acquire the same services or risk
losing market share. The cost of the duplication of services was made up for by charging higher
prices to patients. Anderson, Reinhardt, Hussey, and Petrosyan (It's the Prices, Stupid 2003)
identify the primary cause of rising health care costs in the United States today to be the prices
charged for health care services. As the medical arms race drives up these prices, total health
care expenditures will increase. Specialty hospitals, in focusing on high-profit procedures and
potentially sparking a new medical arms race, have the potential to drive up prices and impact
the wider market for health care.
Another serious charge that has been leveled against specialty hospitals is that they
“steal” revenue from general hospitals. Specialty hospitals have been shown in numerous
studies to focus on certain high-profit procedures. When a specialty hospital opens its doors
close to a general hospital, its patient base must come from somewhere. The concern here is
that the specialty hospitals will skim the highest profit procedures from general hospitals,
leaving general hospitals with the low-profit, high-difficulty procedures. This is an important
consideration because general hospitals use revenue from high-profit procedures to crosssubsidize low-profit but socially-necessary procedures. Microeconomic theory clearly predicts
that businesses that cannot cover the costs of the production process will stop producing. When
this is applied to general hospitals, services whose revenue cannot cover costs would be
discontinued if there was no other source of revenue. High-profit procedures provide this
revenue and enable hospitals to continue providing these services in spite of their negative
2

profits. If specialty hospitals are stealing revenue from hospitals with safety net services, then
general hospitals may no longer be able to provide them. Bodenheimer and Grumbach
(Understanding Health Policy: a Clinical Approach 2009) frame these fears starkly:
…twenty-first century health care in the United States is becoming characterized by a
single-minded quest for profitability that is threatening traditional notions of
professionalism and community service. Emblematic of this trend is the emergence of a
new type of for-profit hospital, the specialty hospital fully or partially owned by groups
of specialist physicians. (p. 200)
These fears are so pronounced that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act passed by
Congress and signed by the President in March of 2010 places severe limits on the construction
of new physician-owned specialty hospitals.
This study intends to examine the relationship between specialty service hospitals in
one particular area—cardiac care—and their impact on the characteristics of the procedures
offered. Specifically, it tries to find a relationship between physician ownership combined with
specialization and the outcomes and costs related to specific procedures by comparing them to
those of general hospitals in the same geographic area. Furthermore, it attempts to determine
the relationship between managed care markets and the cost of care in specialty hospitals. At its
heart, this study aims to answer two questions: First, is there a significant difference between
the characteristics of healthcare provided by specialty hospitals and general hospitals? And
second, if there are differences, what individual and market-wide characteristics can be
identified as major factors in these differences? In answering these questions, it will employ
both linear OLS modeling and hierarchical linear modeling, and attempt to construct a
conceptual framework for understanding the aspects that econometric modeling cannot
explain.

3
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Context of Specialty Service Lines in the United States
Hospital System

Profile of a Specialty Hospital
The most significant and comprehensive study of independent specialty hospitals comes
from the Government Accountability Office in the form of two studies conducted in 2003 and a
third conducted in 2005. These studies were undertaken in response to a proposed
Congressional ban on the construction of new facilities. The first report, “Specialty Hospitals:
Information on National Market Share, Physician Ownership, and Patients Served” (Government
Accountability Office 2003a), sets the definition of a specialty hospital that has been widely
adopted in many studies, including the present one. First: two-thirds of the hospital’s Medicare
admissions (or total admissions where that data exists) must fall into two major diagnosisrelated groups (DRGs), or into surgical categories in general. Second: the hospital must focus on
short-term acute care for those DRGs. Third: there must be some form of physician ownership
stake in the hospital. This definition clearly limits the scope of what can be considered a
specialty hospital. One of the most prominent trends in the development of specialty-service
lines is the joint hospital-physician partnership, in which a service line is developed as a
supplement to the services of a general hospital (this topic will be discussed in greater detail
below). The GAO definition of a specialty-service line excludes these types of ventures, limiting
the scope of any analysis that uses it.
4

The first GAO study also provides statistical descriptions of the specialty hospital
phenomenon. The vast majority of specialty hospitals have been constructed since 1990, or
more importantly, after the rise and decline of managed care in the health insurance industry.
Of these existing hospitals, the most are orthopedic, followed by surgical, with an equal share of
the remaining hospitals split between cardiac and women’s specialties. Furthermore, most
specialty hospitals are much smaller than their general hospital equivalents. This report also
delineates how physician ownership of specialty hospitals takes shape. If anything is certain
from this report, it is that there is no clear pattern of how physicians own specialty hospitals.
Shares vary widely from one percent ownership to total control, with most falling somewhere in
between thirty-one percent and seventy percent. Most individual physicians owned small shares
of hospitals (less than three percent), and no one physician owned more than 18.2 percent.
Most group practices that owned hospitals owned less than twenty-nine percent of the hospital,
and only ten percent owned more than 80 percent of a hospital. Ownership characteristics of
physician-owned specialty hospitals vary widely.
The second GAO study, “Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, Services Provided, and
Financial Performance,” (Government Accountability Office 2003b) creates a breakdown of
hospital ownership structures and geographical locations of specialty hospitals. For the specific
cardiac procedures examined in this study, on average one quarter of the physicians who
directly treat patients have an ownership stake in the hospital. This contingent tends to own
roughly 31 percent of the hospital. These two statistics imply that on average each individual
specialist owns less than 2 percent of the hospital. This figure is somewhat misleading; however,
as ownership tends to be concentrated into revenue-sharing group practices of physicians,
meaning that in some cases the entire 31 percent ownership stake would be shared by one
5

group practice of a few specialists. Also related to the fiscal practices of these hospitals is the
distribution of revenue among specialty hospitals. Among different categories of specialty
hospitals (cardiac, orthopedic, surgical, and women’s hospitals), cardiac hospitals received the
lion’s share of inpatient Medicare spending at 62.1 percent (for comparison, the next closest
category was orthopedic at 18.3 percent). This fact partly influenced the decision to focus on
specialty hospitals with cardiac programs in the current study.
Another important piece of information from this study was the concentration of new and
existing specialty hospitals. The states with the largest number of new or existing specialty
hospitals were California, Arizona, South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana,
followed closely by New York and North Carolina. The GAO attributes growth in these states to
favorable state regulatory environments and demographic characteristics favorable to specialty
hospitals. For example, states with and states without certificate of need (CON) laws each
contain equal portions of the United States’ population. States without CON laws, however,
were the home of nearly five times as many specialty service lines. This suggests that CON laws
significantly hamper the development of specialty hospitals, but this question needs further
research to rule out other demographic or regulatory factors.
One final important consideration in this article is the existence of emergency services in
specialty hospitals. To begin with, 92 percent of general hospitals in the United States have
emergency departments, most of which are in operation around the clock. Less than half of all
specialty hospitals (45 percent) have emergency departments at all, and of those, only 17
percent are open around the clock. Furthermore, the median number of emergency patients per
month at general hospitals was ten times higher than that of specialty hospitals. Some of this
difference can be attributed to differences in size, as general hospitals tend to be much larger
6

than specialty hospitals. These differences clearly indicate that the focus of specialty hospitals is
not emergency care.
The findings of these two foundational studies led the GAO in 2005 to recommend that
Congress impose a moratorium on the construction of new specialty hospitals (Government
Accountability Office 2005), which Congress did until August 2006. Furthermore, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) prohibits any new physician-owned
specialty facilities from receiving Medicare reimbursement. Since Medicare is the single largest
purchaser of hospital services, this limitation makes the construction of a new facility a much
less appealing proposition.

Trends in the United States Hospital System
The emergence of specialty service lines in the United States hospital system does not
exist in a vacuum. In fact, the motivation behind and results of physician ownership of hospitals
reflect trends that have existed since the inauguration of the mature private health care system
in the mid twentieth century. Three of the most relevant trends are the tension that has always
existed between individual providers and hospitals; the so-called medical arms race, a case in
which competitive forces in the hospital market will actually increase market prices; and the
provider moral hazard problem. The character of these three trends has changed over time as
the payment schemes have changed, but all three are relevant to the current study of specialty
service lines and the future development of the United States hospital system.
Physician-Hospital Relationships
Hospital-physician relationships can take on many complex forms, but all of these forms
can be described in part by broad categories. First, physicians and hospital could have a loose
7

affiliation based on geographic proximity or treatment of the same patient base that does not
rest on legal or financial ties. Second, physicians could be outright employees of hospitals,
receiving a salary and treating only patients at the hospital that employs them. Third, and
perhaps most relevant to the present discussion of specialty service lines, physicians can serve
as owners or administrators of hospitals. In this case, the physician usually acts in a similarly to
the situation in which he or she is employed by a hospital, although the level of clinical
autonomy is greatly increased. In reality, physician hospital relationships will take on some
hybrid form of these three broad categories, but these categories are still useful to consider in
the following discussion.
The history of the relationship between hospitals and physicians runs parallel to the
history of health insurance in the United States, specifically with regards to the rise and fall of
managed care. Bodenheimer and Grumbach (Understanding Health Policy: a Clinical Approach
2009) provide useful and descriptive dividing lines in this history. Prior to the advent of managed
care, in what they call the provider-insurer pact, healthcare providers were reimbursed on a feefor-service (FFS) basis in which providers were paid by the service. Physicians and hospitals were
distinct entities in the provision of healthcare. Wherever there was a professional relationship,
physicians viewed hospitals as a workshop of sorts—a place to access technology and resources
that were not feasible to acquire in the individual setting. Hospitals were most interested in
creating relationships with specialists. Where primary care physicians did have the potential to
refer some of their patients to a hospital, specialists were seen the major source of potential
revenue because they would be more likely to have more complex patients to refer to the
hospital. Under the FFS reimbursement method, hospitals and physicians would generate more

8

revenue by simply providing more services, and complex patients would naturally require more
services than healthy ones, provider-induced demand (discussed below) notwithstanding.
Perhaps the most important feature of this phase of physician-hospital relationships is that
hospitals and physicians remained separate entities both legally and financially. The absence of
a direct financial relationship meant that hospitals competed to provide the most attractive
facilities possible for specialists. This situation has significant implications on its own, and fits in
with a broader trend of the potential overprovision of care in hospitals (also discussed below).
Before the rise of managed care, hospitals focused on courting specialists and the referrals they
would bring through non-financial means.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the period that Bodenheimer and Grumbach call the
purchaser revolt and the breakup of the provider-insurer pact, FFS plans were replaced with
various forms of managed care plans. Managed care plans had cost reduction as their explicit
goal, although the tactics they used to achieve that goal varied widely. Perhaps the most
important feature of managed care was the way that it changed the dynamic between hospitals
and physicians. Managed care in the 1980s and 1990s relied on the “gatekeeper” concept of
medical care: patients would need referrals from their primary-care physicians (PCPs) in order to
receive specialty care. The specific methods through which the gatekeeper principle was
enforced varied from plan to plan, but the most common came in the form of selective
contracting. Simply put, insurance plans would only pay for visits with certain physicians and
hospitals, meaning that individuals have strong incentives to seek out and heed referrals.
Hospitals were suddenly much more reliant on PCPs for their business than they had ever been
in the past. As a result, hospitals had an incentive to develop very close ties with PCPs, and
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these ties now began to take on a legally formal and financial character (Berenson,
Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). The precise nature of the relationship varied from one hospital
system to the next, but the archetypal situation was for a hospital system to purchase a primary
care physician practice outright. Other less explicit relationships were also widely employed,
ranging from formal independent practice associations (IPAs) that would contract with one
hospital system for referral purposes to informal preferences in the use of certain facilities
(Lake, et al. 2003). Whatever the character of these relationships, the goal was the same: to
capture all possible referrals for specialty care and surgery from as many PCPs as possible. In
anticipation of a health insurance market dominated by managed care organizations, hospitalPCP relationships became increasingly important. Managed care organizations instituted and
relied upon incentives that brought physicians and hospitals close together, setting the
precedent for close formal or informal financial relationships between the two.
The unexpectedly slow rise and eventual decline of fully risk-based managed care in
health insurance added a new twist to the physician-hospital relationship. While most health
insurance plans today do still retain some elements of managed care, most have also returned
to a FFS payment system for physician services. 1 In short, managed care worked to shift the
financial risk inherent in the provision of care to the provider, and the return to FFS shifts the
risk back to the insurance plan and ultimately the patient. Where risk-based managed care
created an incentive for hospital systems to work with primary care providers, fee-for-service
reimbursement returns the emphasis to care provided by specialists. Once again, specialty care

1

One relatively simple and particularly helpful example of the mix of risk-based and FFS plan design is the
current state of Medicare Parts A and B. Part A, which covers inpatient hospitalization (among other
things) employs risk-based payment based on the DRG (all providers receive the same payment for a
given diagnosis regardless of how it is treated); Part B, which covers physician services, remains FFS.
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is a major revenue source. One significant difference from the pre-managed care period is that
now hospitals and physicians have no reason not to form close legal and financial relationships.
To state the matter simply, hospitals and physicians traditionally occupy different
domains in the delivery of healthcare, but physician-owned specialty service lines encompass
both professional and institutional settings of care (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006).
Where most hospitals organize themselves around the specific services provided (for example, a
medical wing, a diagnostic center, a single floor comprised of nothing but operating rooms),
specialty service lines cross services and instead focus on conditions. As a result, many specialty
service lines can be self-contained units, even if they are partially or entirely owned by general
hospitals. Where institutional and professional services were once distinct components of the
healthcare system, specialty service lines blur this boundary. Physician-owned specialty service
lines are simultaneously reigniting old relationships with hospitals and striking out in a new
direction. Hospitals again compete for relationships with specialists; however, now the typical
hospital-specialist relationship becomes one with formal legal and financial force, where before
it was only an informal one.
The Medical Arms Race
The medical arms race also follows the rise and decline of managed care in health
insurance. Prior to this time frame, insurance companies reimbursed hospitals for specific
services in the traditional FFS method. Under the FFS payment system, hospitals delivered
patient-centered care. (Dranove, Shanley and White 1993). One important feature of patientcentered care was competition between hospitals over quality of care, and this competition was
most fierce in less concentrated hospital markets. In pursuit of this goal, hospitals sought to
11

attract the best physicians, which generally meant acquiring the most advanced medical
technology and creating excess bed capacity for inpatient care. The result of institutional
competition of this nature is “a *large+ number of duplicate specialized services in local markets”
(Santerre and Neun 2010, 421), and the consequences of service duplication are clear: “…new
technology is acquired primarily for defensive purposes. …Hospitals constantly attempt to
expand services to enhance their status, not because profit maximization or efficiency call for
*it+” (Santerre and Neun 2010, 415). Empirical research generally agrees that the rise and
dominance of managed care in the 1980s and 1990s forced hospitals to compete based on price
rather than quality, so hospital care became “payer-driven” (Dranove, Shanley and White 1993).
The shift to price competition made the medical arms race more difficult, as profit maximization
(or cost minimization in the case of not-for-profit hospitals) put limits on expansions that were
previously undertaken for status.
Non-price competition between had a brief period of darkness in which risk-based
managed care forced it underground, but as managed care contracts proved to be less
burdensome than anticipated and as hospital markets grew more concentrated, non-price
competition made a resurgence (Devers, Brewster and Casalino 2003). One of the most
significant forms of non-price competition is to target physicians for referrals and to target
potential patients directly (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). Furthermore, in the late
1990s and early 2000s, hospital competition began to become more intense, and technological
advances began to allow certain procedures to be performed in an ambulatory setting.
Traditional general hospitals saw more well-insured patients leaving their walls for independent
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diagnostic centers, ambulatory surgical centers, and physician-owned specialty hospitals.
Berenson, Bodenheimer, and Pham summarize the issue well:
“…while hospitals find a competitive need to promote a service-line orientation, an
approach that requires the participation of key physicians, at the same time they often
face growing competition from physician-owned service lines” (Specialty Service Lines:
Salvos in the New Medican Arms Race 2006, 338).
Not only are hospitals forced to compete with each other for high volumes of well-insured
patients, they are also forced to compete to retain highly-skilled physicians who are now finding
it profitable to strike out on their own.
Competition for patient volumes leads hospitals to pursue aggressive advertising
strategies. The application of the Dorfman and Steiner (1954) model of advertising to hospital
services can offer insights regarding the structure of hospitals that pursue such aggressive
advertising. The first key insight is that advertising expenditure will be greater when demand is
inelastic to price. It is hard to imagine a situation in which demand is less responsive to price
than that of health care, specifically medical and surgical interventions that require
hospitalization. The second important implication of the Dorfman and Steiner model is that
advertising intensity will be greater when the gap between marginal cost and price is greater—
in other words, when firms have greater market power. The reimbursement plans that many
health insurance entities employ virtually guarantee that this situation will exist for inpatient
hospitals, and this relationship is discussed in more detail below. It is worth noting that Dorfman
and Steiner developed their model under the assumptions of monopoly, but the results are
easily generalizable to any competitive structure (Santerre and Neun 2010, 409).
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Competition for physicians leads hospitals to pursue advanced technologies and excess
capacity. The past decade has seen growing pressure from both physicians and patients for socalled “one-stop shopping”; that is, having diagnostic services and treatment take place in the
same facility and even during the same visit (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). This has
led hospitals to purchase expensive diagnostic technologies, or to make these tools more widely
available. In addition, physician alternatives to hospital care, such as independent physician
associations or community health centers, work to acquire the same technologies. Proliferation
of these expensive tertiary services always seems to outpace the underlying demand for them,
creating a system with excess capacity for technologically-intensive medical services. Excess
capacity in this system actually serves to increase the price of care, rather than decrease it as
traditional economic theory would suggest. Hospitals simply pass on higher per-unit costs to
payers like Medicare and private insurance companies rather than decreasing the price to
attract new customers (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2009). The medical arms race for
technologically-intensive diagnostic and treatment facilities is a clear case of fierce competition
between health care providers, but in this case, cutthroat competition does not punish high-cost
producers and actually serves to increase prices.
Physician-owned specialty hospitals combine patient-oriented and specialist-oriented
competition. Furthermore, physician-owned hospitals force their general hospital competitors
to engage in similar tactics to remain competitive, and by all accounts they have done so.
General hospitals are not feeling the financial squeeze that they might from competing specialty
hospitals because they are able to raise the prices that they charge to insurers and patients on
services that specialty hospitals simply cannot provide. Often, these services include emergency
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room services, labor and delivery services, mental health care, and other services typically
associated with the “safety net.” In the words of one anonymous hospital administrator,
“*h+ospital prices never fall” (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006, 342).
Provider Moral Hazard and Physician Self-Referral
Conceptually speaking, there is a clear possibility for providers to over-supply medical
care to their patients in order to increase their own incomes. This issue is typically presented as
a case of a principle/agent problem: the physician is acting both as an economic agent
representing his or her own self-interests and as someone representing the interests of the
patient. In an obvious case of asymmetric information, the physician has the potential ability to
sway individual decision making towards his or her own interest. Clearly, this has the potential
to derail the typical functioning of a neoclassically-conceived market (McGuire 2000). In short,
provider moral hazard has the potential to cause the overprovision of unnecessary medical
services.2 In an attempt to prevent provider moral hazard from leading to the over-provision of
medical services, Congress adopted regulations collectively known as the Stark laws between
the 1980s and early 2000s. The main thrust of these regulations is to prevent providers from
gaining financially through the referral of patients to services by denying Medicare
reimbursement for referrals to facilities in which the referring physician has an ownership stake
and by extending antitrust regulations into the medical services industry. As a result, these laws
are commonly referred to as the anti-self-referral laws. There is one glaring exception to these
laws, however: in the verbiage of the 2001 Stark II regulations, the surgical investor in
ambulatory surgical centers; in more familiar terms, the physician-owner of a specialty service
2

The existence and extent of provider moral hazard is probably the most well-discussed and
contentiously-debated topics in all of health economics. Thomas Rice (2003) presents a comprehensive
overview of studies attempting to prove and disprove the existence and extent of provider moral hazard.
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line (Berenson, Bodenheimer and Pham 2006). While the moratorium on new construction and
the end of Medicare reimbursement for new facilities may have presented serious challenges to
specialty service lines, the exception laid out in anti-self-referral regulations removes a
significant barrier.
Medicare payment of inpatient services via the DRG exacerbates provider moral hazard.
Medicare’s DRGs are re-configured periodically in order to accommodate changes in technique
or the emergence of new diseases. In essence, Medicare (and Medicaid, which typically follows
Medicare’s reimbursement strategies) determines prices for treatments when they are new to
the market. Industrial organization theories generally agree that most technological advances in
production will tend to be most costly before they are widely adopted. The distance between
the cost of treatment and the price paid for it grows larger over time, creating a clear incentive
to provide newer and more technology-intensive treatments. Furthermore, Medicare’s DRG
pricing method relies of hospital-reported costs of delivering care. According to Ginsburg and
Grossman “Providers have limited incentives to devote the resources to set charges that
accurately reflect the relative costs because a large part of their revenue is not directly
influenced by their own charge structure” (When the Price Isn't Right 2005). Outdated
reimbursement structures have made surgery in general and cardiovascular surgery in particular
two of the most profitable categories of medical care. Medicare isolates providers from the true
price of the services they provide through its prospective payment system. Physician-owned
specialty service lines exploit the inherent problems in the DRG by focusing on the newer and
more technologically-intensive procedures that have the widest divergence between cost and
price.

16

Determinants of Health
Healthcare in the United States is generally defined, organized, and delivered along the
lines of individual determinants of health. The individual determinants of health model has two
primary components: the role of individual choice in health status and the biomedical model of
illness and treatment. The role of individual choice in health status generally argues that
individuals’ lifestyle choices are the primary driver of their health. People that make the right
choices will not need healthcare; poor choices lead to poor health status. The biomedical model
of illness and treatment is probably the single most dominant trend in the training of medical
professionals and the development of medical technology, and its influence is apparent in the
emergence of specialty service lines. The principle tenant of the biomedical model of illness and
treatment is the idea that all diseases have discrete, knowable causes that reside within the
body. Diagnosis of a disease is simply the working out if this cause, and treatment can
theoretically take the form of a “silver bullet,” although there are clearly many diseases for
which the silver-bullet cure has not been found. This model has been the object of scrutiny and
criticism in recent years, and the main charge against it is that it relies too heavily on
technological solutions and highly specialized care. Indeed, the development of the United
States healthcare system has typically highly favored specialized, technologically-intensive care,
and many scholars attribute this trend to the biomedical model of medicine (Bodenheimer and
Grumbach 2009). Specialty service lines offer one particular example of how the biomedical
model manifests itself in the United States healthcare system. Specialty service lines pride
themselves on having the most advanced technology for the treatment of specific acute
illnesses. In doing so, they are affirming the idea that technology is the cure for each illness and
that the illnesses that they treat have finite discrete internal causes.
17

An opposing model is commonly referred to as the social determinants of health model.
This conception of disease and treatment does not deny that there are discrete any knowable
causes for diseases. Rather than these being the only relevant factors, proponents of the social
determinants of health argue that there are a wide range of social, economic, and demographic
factors that contribute to a person’s health. In this sense, diagnosis of a disease is a combination
of many qualities of a patient, of which the pathological cause of the disease is only one. In a
similar way, the treatment of the disease not only focuses on its internal cause, but also on
education and mitigation of the causes of recurring chronic medical problems. The social
determinants of health approach is a large and growing school of thought, though Marmot
(Social Determinants of Health Inequalities 2005) provides an excellent summary of it. Specialist
treatments and technologically-intensive cures still exist in a system based on the social
determinants of health approach, but their role is greatly diminished.
These two opposing models have clear and different implications regarding the role of
physicians in healthcare and the role of healthcare in society. The social determinants of health
approach indicates that physicians will usually have a central role in healthcare, and that a
relationship between physicians and individuals will be central to the healthcare process.
Furthermore, since the causes of illness lie outside of the individual, healthcare will necessarily
have a social character. On the other hand, the individual determinants of health model
suggests that healthcare is a good that belongs in the market. Individuals make decisions that
give them a certain health status, and the healthcare that they need as a result is subject to
their tastes and preferences. In this case, physicians begin take on the role of the entrepreneur.
They are selling a product that individuals will choose to consume. Their relationship with their
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patients has the potential to become an impersonal one, like those between the buyers and
sellers of other goods in the market. Where the social determinants of health model deemphasizes the role of specialized healthcare and technology, the individual determinants of
health model raises the possibility for the simultaneously commodification of healthcare and
professionalization of healthcare providers.
Specialty service lines evolved in a market context that includes a long-running history
of interaction between insurance companies and government agencies; fierce competition
among hospitals for a limited patient market; and changes in demographic that lead to changes
in health status and health disparities. All of these relationships have caused transformations in
the way that all hospitals deliver care, and these particular transformations in individual
hospitals can be analyzed in terms of mainstream economic theory. Understanding why
specialty hospitals are distinctive requires both an understanding of the broad context of the
American healthcare system as a whole and of the specific operational features of individual
hospitals. There have been few attempts to create an economically-grounded theory of
production of specialty health care, since most studies rely on interviews or surveys. However,
one noteworthy attempt will be discussed below.

Neoclassical Theory of Production Applied to Specialty Service Lines
Much of the following discussion of how the neoclassical theory of production can be
applied to specialty service lines will be drawn from Schneider, Miller, Ohsfeldt, Morrisey,
Zelner, and Li (The Economics of Sepcialty Hospitals 2008) and from Cowing and Holtmann
(Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions 1983), with theoretical and conceptual
development from Varian’s Microeconomic Analysis (1992) where necessary. This theoretical
19

development will then be analyzed in terms of both the findings of a set of econometric models
and by drawing on less mainstream economic theories.
Though Schneider et.al. do not make the distinction, all of the six different economic
motivators that they identify (consumer demand, economies of scale, avoidance of
diseconomies of scope, administrative efficiencies, clinical efficiencies, and focused incentives;
discussed below) can be grouped broadly into two categories: quality of care improvements and
productive efficiencies leading to lower-cost production. It is worth noting that these two
categories already acknowledge that the canonical model of perfect competition does not apply
to the market for hospital services. On the one hand, differences in quality cannot exist when all
firms produce the same product; and on the other hand, productive efficiencies in one firm or a
small subset of firms would not be a sustainable situation in perfect competition. These two
facts allow Schneider et. al. to dispense with the limitations of perfect competition and move to
the potentially more interesting implications of imperfect competition.
Quality of the Product
Differential quality can be explained by several different factors, the first of which is
consumer demand. Consumer demand for specialty services can largely be divided into two
main drivers: the market’s demand for specific services and its demand to consume high-quality
instances of these services. Schneider et. al. cite several studies that point to rapidly increasing
consumer demand for technological-intensive treatments for specific acute conditions. General
hospitals remain slow to adapt to this significant change in consumers’ tastes and preferences,
and as a result specialized firms rise up to exploit this untapped segment of the market. Once
these specific services become available, consumers begin to demand the highest quality
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available for these services. Once again, several studies seem to support the hypothesis that
physician-owned hospitals do deliver higher quality care, and the main driver behind high
quality appears to be high patient volumes and financial accountability on the part of the
physicians performing the services. The second significant driver of differential quality is high
patient volumes, and these high volumes can be attributed to economics of scale and
diseconomies of scope in the production of hospital services. While Schneider et. al. concede
that there is a dearth of empirical research on either of these issues, the conceptual effects of
both are clear: economies of scale allow specialty hospitals to improve the quality of production
as relative more resources are devoted to fewer endeavors; diseconomies of scope prevent
general hospitals from realizing these same improvements.
Costs of Production
Generally speaking, a hospital’s cost function takes the form:
(
where

)

(1)

is a variable cost function,

is a vector of total outputs with the

vector represents the output for a specific procedure or treatment,
prices,

is capital, and

represents physician labor, and

and

member of the

is the vector of input

are the prices of capital and

physician labor respectively (Cowing and Holtmann 1983). The transformations in production
that are outlined below will generally result in the specific character of the

function.

Lower-cost productive efficiencies generally fall into three categories. First, specialty
hospitals focus their production into services for which they have higher procedural margins.
Differences in procedural margins imply that hospitals as rational profit-maximizers specialize in
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the services contained in DRGs for which they have the lowest costs. General hospitals fail to
make the same decisions because they are hampered by their mission to provide less-profitable
safety net services.3 Second, general hospitals have several internal barriers to the provision of
care that specialty hospitals do not, meaning that specialty hospitals have what the authors
refer to as clinical efficiencies. Understanding clinical efficiencies in specialty hospitals is easiest
by understanding why, according to Schneider et. al., they do not exist in general hospitals:
general hospitals have many competing missions, ranging from serving underserved populations
to treating basic health problems and including profit only has the last in a long list. Specialty
hospitals, on the other hand, have one mission: high volumes of patients receiving profitable
services at a high level of quality. The third and final advantage that specialty hospitals hold
over their general hospital competitors is their ability to exploit “learning by doing” to lower
costs of production. Essentially, high volumes of patients allow physicians and nurses in
specialty hospitals to gain higher levels of expertise more quickly. This in turn allows them to
provide care with less waste and with fewer mistakes. Once again, learning by doing is a difficult
thing to quantify, and Schneider et. al. rely on survey responses in addition to studies that
correlate high volume and quality of outcome to support this argument. Neoclassical economics
suggests that firms facing a profit maximization problem are simultaneously solving a cost
minimization problem. In examining both procedural margins clinical efficiencies, and “learning
by doing,” Schneider et. al. come to the conclusion that the focus on profitability not only
defines specialty hospitals, it also gives them a significant advantage in lowering costs of
production.
3

This conclusion is essentially the same as the one drawn above in the discussion of the relationship
between the DRG are provider moral hazard, though Schneider et. al. phrase the argument in terms of
comparative advantage.
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The neoclassical development outlined above identifies two significant differences
between specialty hospitals and their general hospital competitors—quality and cost—and
identifies several drivers for these differences. To examine these claims in the particular context
of cardiac care provided to Medicare beneficiaries, the present study will first turn to
econometric analyses, including linear OLS modeling and hierarchical linear modeling based on
facility data collected from hospital cost reports and market-level data collected from other
public data sources. While the models that follow will not be derived from cost or utility
functions, they will still address some of the claims made above. For claims that cannot be fully
explained through econometric analysis, a more conceptual framework will be developed.
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3

The Data and the Model

The Data
Specialty heart hospitals are included in the study following the strict GAO definition
described in the profile of specialty hospitals above: they must all be short-term acute care
facilities, they much be free-standing facilities, they must have some form of physician
ownership, and two-thirds of their inpatient admissions must fall into two or fewer DRGs during
the most recent federal fiscal year of cost report data available. This yields a sample of 25
specialty hospitals. The sample of competitor general hospitals meets several of the same
criteria: they are also classified as short-term acute care facilities and they offer all of the same
categories of cardiac procedures as their specialist competitors. They also meet a criterion of
geographic proximity to a specialty hospital, and this criterion will be discussed in greater detail
below. After these competitors are identified, the sample of general hospitals contains 15 forprofit hospitals and 62 hospitals that fall into a not-for-profit category, which includes
traditional not-for-profit hospitals, government-owned hospitals, hospitals owned by religious
organizations, and academic institutions such as university hospitals.
The primary source of hospital data in the present study is the American Hospital
Directory (www.ahd.com). The American Hospital Directory compiles data from nearly every
hospital’s Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) report, which hospitals are legally
obligated to compile to receive Medicare reimbursement. The information contained in the
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report can be divided into seven categories. First, there is information on the general
characteristics of the hospital, including its size, total revenue, aggregate utilization statistics,
services offered, and the mix of the patients admitted by payer source (Medicare, Medicaid, and
private payer/self-funded patients). Second, this same high-level information is broken down to
the level of the individual department within the hospital. Third, each hospital reports more
detailed statistics of its revenues by payer source and its costs by high-level area (patient care,
personnel costs, administration, etc.). This data is then used to calculate certain indicators of the
hospital’s overall financial health, specifically its net profit margin and its return on assets and
equity. Fifth, each hospital reports statistics on nationally-recognized quality measures for a
broad range of health conditions and treatments. Sixth, cost and utilization information are
reported at the aggregate treatment level for inpatient services. The seventh category contains
the same data for outpatient services, but this area is not considered in the present study.
Although MedPAC hospital cost reports do not contain medical record-level data that other
more ambitious reviews of specialty service lines have utilized, the data that they do contain is
still extremely useful in profiling the services that a hospital provides.
One primary concern with this data source is that the data available only come from
Medicare-covered patients and procedures. Broadly speaking, this restricts data to treatments
that only people aged 65 and over would undergo. While this is not necessarily a significant flaw
to this study regarding inpatient cardiology procedures, it prevents generalization to some other
important categories of specialty hospitals, especially children’s hospitals, hospitals specializing
in breast and cervical cancer treatment, obstetrics, bariatric surgeries, or hospitals that favor
surgical treatment over medical treatment generally. Reliance on Medicare data for the analysis
could potentially reduce the external validity of its results, especially in these noted areas.
25

Many non-specialty hospitals, furthermore, do not rely on Medicare as a source of
revenue in the same way specialty hospitals do. One of the primary arguments against specialty
hospitals is that they “steal” revenue from general hospitals. General hospitals can rely on
Medicaid and other indigent care programs as major sources of funding (although this assertion
is questionable). On the contrary, the majority of specialty hospitals’ revenue comes from
Medicare. In response to this deficiency in the available data, however, Medicare is the single
largest source of revenue for hospital services, comprising more total revenue for hospitals than
all private funding streams combined. (Santerre and Neun 2010, 406). Furthermore, since
specialty hospitals tend to specialize in the treatment of conditions that affect mainly Medicare
patients (cardiology or orthopedics for example), most of the revenue that they would “steal”
would be revenue for Medicare patients. Finally, Medicaid and other indigent care programs
typically reimburse hospitals at a much lower rate than other insurance plans, and as a result
Medicaid caseload is often seen as more of a burden than a benefit for general hospitals.
Problems of incommensurability regarding revenue sources are certainly worth noting, but are
not expected to significantly affect the results of the analysis.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and the significance of the differences in means
resulting from a one-way ANOVA for these facility-level variables. Appendix A contains a
glossary for these and other relevant variables. Perhaps one of the most interesting results of
this preliminary descriptive analysis is that although specialty hospitals are much smaller
facilities than general hospitals (measured by either number of beds or the total number of
patients), they actually tend to have larger shares of the cardiac patient market than general
hospitals, measured by the number of patients they treat relative to the total number of
patients in the market. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in the total revenue
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received from cardiac procedures between the two groups of hospitals. Clearly, the specialty
hospitals in this sample are focusing their resources into a few procedural categories. Another
important feature is that there appears to be no statistically significant difference in average
cost for cardiac surgeries between specialty and general hospitals. Finally, the specialty hospitals
in this sample do appear to have higher quality outcomes, measured by their 30-day mortality
and readmission rates. In addition, specialty hospitals have higher nurse-to-patient ratios and
higher amounts of capital per patient, and these results are statistically significant. These initial
results will be the starting point for a more detailed econometric analysis below.
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Total Beds***

Total Inpatients***
Market Share (All
Patients)***
Cardiac
Inpatients**
Market Share
(Cardiac Patients)**
Total Salary Cost
(millions)***
Total Non-Salary
Cost (millions)***
Total Cost
(millions)***
Total Nurses***
Nurse to Patient
Ratio***
Capital per
Patient***
Cardiac Revenue
(millions)
Cardiac Cost
(millions)
Cardiac average
Length of Stay***

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Facility Variables
Std.
Mean
Minimum
Deviation
General
469.01
307.39
105.00
Specialty
102.72
102.93
32.00
All
379.24
314.14
32.00
General
19,379.22
11,903.71
3,775.00
Specialty
4,433.40
3,390.58
1,603.00
All
15,716.03
12,292.10
1,603.00
General
23.67%
17.47%
2.14%
Specialty
6.97%
4.42%
1.35%
All
19.57%
16.92%
1.35%
General
1,965.87
1,423.92
335.00
Specialty
1,983.32
1,327.23
745.00
All
1,970.15
1,394.39
335.00
General
18.46%
13.19%
1.63%
Specialty
23.11%
10.83%
7.61%
All
19.60%
12.76%
1.63%
General
$35.83
$31.25
$4.02
Specialty
$9.25
$7.02
$3.38
All
$29.32
$29.64
$3.38
General
$49.21
$50.10
$5.60
Specialty
$14.44
$10.43
$4.38
All
$40.69
$46.27
$4.38
General
$85.04
$79.70
$11.60
Specialty
$23.69
$17.32
$7.87
All
$70.01
$74.53
$7.87
General
710.82
625.22
65.00
Specialty
150.56
170.97
0.00
All
573.50
599.79
0.00
General
2.06
0.87
0.33
Specialty
2.76
1.60
0.00
All
2.23
1.13
0.00
General
$2,379.73
$971.14
$838.79
Specialty
$3,495.38
$1,585.71
$1,936.77
All
$2,653.17
$1,240.87
$838.79
General
111.4085
97.01742
13.58
Specialty
106.0996
89.52100
34.15
All
110.1073
94.82705
13.58
General
32.9379
37.21713
5.11
Specialty
30.1851
27.14178
11.24
All
32.2632
34.91035
5.11
General
4.61
0.60
3.39
Specialty
3.78
0.79
2.32
All
4.40
0.74
2.32
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Maximum
1,836.00
518.00
1,836.00
72,898.00
15,152.00
72,898.00
84.96%
19.68%
84.96%
8,565.00
6,696.00
8,565.00
54.56%
45.44%
54.56%
$210.70
$31.95
$210.70
$378.18
$48.17
$378.18
$588.88
$80.12
$588.88
4,285.00
678.00
4,285.00
4.40
7.84
7.84
$5,897.51
$8,735.99
$8,735.99
515.60
453.74
515.60
202.52
147.35
202.52
6.37
5.78
6.37

ED Visits not
leading to inpatient
stay***
Total ED Visits***
Inpatient
Surgeries***
Outpatient
Surgeries***
All Surgeries***

Services***
30-Day Coronary
Mortality Rate*
30-Day Coronary
Readmission
Rate***
Cardiac Average
Cost (thousands)
Cardiac Average
Charge (thousands)
***:

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Facility Variables
Std.
Mean
Minimum
Deviation
General
29,837.66
17,459.63
7,300.00
Specialty
3,620.00
4,147.49
0.00
All
23,411.76
19,023.94
0.00
General
47,235.06
25,305.39
10,500.00
Specialty
5,620.00
7,357.42
0.00
All
37,035.29
28,606.32
0.00
General
9,780.52
6,282.56
1,500.00
Specialty
2,872.00
2,092.55
1,200.00
All
8,087.25
6,297.57
1,200.00
General
11,257.14
10,549.44
200.00
Specialty
1,508.00
2,397.73
100.00
All
8,867.65
10,142.46
100.00
General
21,037.66
14,781.53
4,700.00
Specialty
4,380.00
4,037.84
1,400.00
All
16,954.90
14,836.91
1,400.00
General
29.25
5.80
15.00
Specialty
13.52
4.89
9.00
All
25.39
8.79
9.00
General
12.19%
1.69%
7.28%
Specialty
11.49%
1.25%
9.47%
All
12.02%
1.62%
7.28%
General
22.70%
1.74%
18.15%
Specialty
21.47%
1.91%
17.62%
All
22.39%
1.85%
17.62%
General
$15.50
$6.30
$7.62
Specialty
$14.90
$3.63
$8.80
All
$15.35
$5.75
$7.62
General
$54.31
$17.18
$22.06
Specialty
$51.78
$16.35
$27.53
All
$53.69
$16.94
$22.06
ANOVA for Difference in Means Between Groups:
**:
*:
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Maximum
84,200.00
19,700.00
84,200.00
129,800.00
34,700.00
129,800.00
39,100.00
10,500.00
39,100.00
57,700.00
11,800.00
57,700.00
77,600.00
18,400.00
77,600.00
42.00
31.00
42.00
19.11%
14.68%
19.11%
27.87%
25.99%
27.87%
$47.16
$22.84
$47.16
$112.55
$100.37
$112.55

The second major data source is the Area Research File (ARF) compiled by the
Department of Health and Human Services’ Heath Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) for 2007. The 2007 edition of the ARF combines data from the 2000 census with data
taken from community surveys, Medicare administrative data, statewide Medicaid and indigent
care records, provider licensing databases, and a wide variety of other sources to create a
comprehensive overview of each county in the United States, both demographically and in
terms of health care services available and utilized. Specifically, the present study used data
from the ARF regarding the number of people enrolled in Medicare in the region and for what
reason (age or disability), regulatory information regarding certificate of need (CON) laws,
poverty rates for specific groups, the prevalence of Advantage managed care plans among those
enrolled in Medicare, and the number of federally-qualified health centers (FQHCs) in the
market. Information on access to FQHCs could be particularly interesting because recent
research shows a potential link between FQHC utilization and favorable health outcomes
(Brookler, et al. 2011). Data in the ARF is usually presented at the county level, and then
aggregated to the state level. For the present study, data are aggregated appropriately for the
core-based statistical area (CBSAs) in question. The decision to rely on the CBSA as the
workhorse geographic cordon will be discussed below.
Finally, the information on insurance market competition is drawn from an American
Medical Association study on HMO and PPO market concentrations (Competition in Health
Insurance 2007). This study calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) values for managed
care markets in general and HMO markets and PPO markets specifically in each metropolitan
statistical area (MSA). The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual
firm in a market, giving it a range of values from 0 (perfect competition) to 10,000 (perfect
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monopoly). The Department of Justice has defined key transition points of market
competitiveness in the HHI continuum: markets with a score of less than 1,000 are considered
reasonably competitive; a score of 1,200 indicates potential anticompetitive concentration; any
concentration of greater than 1,800 is considered oligopolistic; and a score of 5,000 indicates a
duopoly. Data were not available for all MSAs that contained a specialty hospital included in the
study population. In these cases, the MSA that was geographically closest to the MSA of interest
was chosen as a substitute. Specifically, Sioux Falls, SD was represented by Sioux City, IA-NE-SD
and Wichita, KS was represented by Kansas City, MO-KS. In addition, the AMA study also
presents the market shares of the two largest insurers in the market, as measured by the
number of enrollees divided by the number of insured people in the market not enrolled in
Medicare or Medicaid. These two figures can be added together to create a two-firm
concentration measure (C2) of the competitiveness of the market. Typical protocol in the field of
industrial organization is to add the market shares of the four, six, or eight largest firms to get a
sense of a market’s competitiveness. The study citied only presents market shares for the two
largest firms. This could be the result of the simple fact that many health insurance markets may
not have more than two significant insurers once Medicare, Medicaid, and other indigent care
financing schemes are excluded. The study’s authors do not offer an explanation. This
information creates a picture of competition in the health insurance markets.
The definition of the relevant product market (RPM) is never straightforward in
economic analysis, and clearly this has the potential to be a weakness in the present study. An
adequate relevant product market should include all alternatives that producers and consumers
choose in response to a change in price. There has been extensive study on what exactly should
constitute a relevant product market, and some studies suggest that for highly-specialized care,
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the relevant product market could stretch beyond metropolitan areas or even state borders
(Santerre and Neun 2010). Hospital data in the present study was collected under the
assumption that the CBSA is the best choice for a relevant product market that can be easily
defined and compared to other markets. Furthermore, the data on competition in health
insurance markets noted above were collected at the MSA level, and MSAs are a specific type of
CBSA. Confounding this decision is that fact that the ARF data is reported at the county level. In
many cases, CBSAs are defined in terms of counties, so the two can often be considered
analogously. This correspondence breaks down in the case of megapolitan cities that span
counties or even states, yet are still defined by a single CBSA. In cases where multiple counties
were included in the same CBSA, county-level values were replaced with average values
weighted for the relative population of the county.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and the significance of the mean differences
resulting from an ANOVA for these market-level variables. Appendix A contains a glossary for
these and other relevant variables. These results clearly indicate that there is no single type of
market in which the specialty service lines in this sample appear. Hospital markets range from
highly competitive with an HHI value of less than 1,000 to near monopolies with an HHI of over
7,000. The insurance markets are less widely dispersed, but nonetheless reflect important
differences in competitiveness. Furthermore, Medicare Advantage penetration rates vary
widely, as does total Medicare enrollment. There is also significant variation in the number of
FQHCs in these markets. The underlying level of heart health in the population also varies
widely, as measured by the coronary death rate. All of these results are highly statistically
significant, indicating that there is wide variation between the overall market structure from one
CBSA to the next.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Market Variables
Std.
Mean
Deviation
Cardiac Inpatient HHI (hundreds of
22.52
10.51
points)***
All Inpatient HHI (hundreds of points)***
27.09
14.40
MCO HHI (hundreds of points)***
34.24
14.39
Medicare Advantage Plan Penetration
20.39%
15.44%
Rate***
Medicare Enrollees***
1,878,093.07 2,817,657.53
FQHCs***
62.06
69.09
Coronary Death Rate (per 100,000)***
85.16
18.41
ANOVA for Difference in Means Between Groups:
***:
**:
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Minimum

Maximum

7.03

50.42

7.29
15.35

74.45
72.23

0.73%

40.46%

25,440
0
43.62

7,862,490
198
121.13

*:

Hierarchical Linear Modeling in Public Health Analysis
Hierarchical linear modeling (also called multilevel modeling, linear mixed modeling, or
random-effects modeling) is a relatively new technique to public health, so it is worthwhile to
describe what it is, what its underlying structure is, and why it is appropriate for the current
analysis. The basic concept behind hierarchical linear modeling is simple: it is a tool to explain
individual outcomes using both individual-level and group-level variables. Variation in the
dependent variable of a hierarchical linear model can only be explained as a function of
variables defined at various levels, and by interactions of variables within and between levels. As
a result, hierarchical linear modeling “allows researchers to deal with the micro-level of
individuals and the macro-level of groups or contexts simultaneously” (Diez-Roux 2000, 174). In
addition to recognizing the structure of the underlying data, hierarchical linear modeling also
incorporates less orthodox statistical techniques to estimate the parameters of the model.
Hierarchical linear modeling attempts to correct for some of the significant problems
typically associated with linear regression with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of
parameters. Probably the most significant difference between OLS and HLM stems from the
presumed independence of all observations in OLS. Conceptually speaking, OLS regression relies
on the assumption that all individuals in a population or sample are totally independent of one
another. Once individuals are not independent, then standard errors can become biased and
estimators will be inefficient. HLM, on the other hand, attempts to treat individual observations
as members of groups, and groups only need to be independent of one another at the highest
level in the hierarchy. In order to achieve this, HLM uses either maximum likelihood (ML) or
restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation of parameters. More adequate developments
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of the differences between OLS linear regression and hierarchical linear modeling, and of why
ML and REML estimations may lead to better predictors than OLS estimators can be found in
Twisk (Applied Multilevel Analysis: A Practical Guide 2006), Hox (Applied Multilevel Analysis
1995), or Raudenbush and Bryk (Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis
Methods 2006).
The data described above, with individual-level hospital statistics and comprehensive
data on the surrounding hospital market, clearly lends itself to hierarchical linear analysis very
well. The data are taken to exist at two levels: the individual hospital level, and the county/CBSA
level for the hospital market. In reviewing the context of the system in which specialty service
lines exist, it should become clear that observations of individual hospitals in a market cannot
seriously be considered to be independent of one another. All of them are subject to similar
demographic features of the population from which they will be drawing their patients, and all
of them are under similar pressures from the insurance companies from whom they receive
reimbursement. Furthermore, strategic behavior exists between hospitals in the same market in
the form of the medical arms race. Individual observations influence each other, and are also
influenced by their group context. For these reasons, the assumption of independence of
individual observations within the data is severely questionable. Hierarchical linear modeling
can bypass this assumption with the aim of increasing the internal validity of the analysis.

The Models
This analysis attempts to answer several questions, but all of these questions center
around one issue: what are the significant differences between physician-owned specialty
hospitals and their competitor general hospitals, specifically in terms of quality and costs of
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production? The econometric models described below will attempt to answer this question and
to identify significant facility-level motivators for these cost and quality differences. All of these
results will be interpreted with a specific attention paid to health insurance market
competitiveness wherever possible to attempt to draw conclusions about how stronger or
weaker managed care regimes may or may not be affecting outcomes and costs. Furthermore,
other market-level variables, for example hospital concentration and demographic data, will be
included to attempt to explain the role of market context in driving cost and quality differences.
In order to examine the technique of hierarchical linear modeling described above, all of the
econometric analyses will begin using only facility-level variables in linear OLS estimation
models, then progress to linear OLS models that contain both facility- and market-level
variables, then finally to the hierarchical linear models of facility- and market-level variables.
All of the linear OLS models will take the form:
(2)
Where
variables

is a vector of coefficients for all variables contained in the vector of independent
(which includes an intercept term), and

is a random, normally-distributed error

term. Facility-level models are distinguished from facility-level and market-level models only by
the particular variables contained in the vector

. By contrast, all of the hierarchical linear

models that follow take the form:
(3)
Equation 3 is the combination of a system of two equations. The first equation is the level one
model:
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(4)
Where

is the intercept in the

variables in the

hospital market,

hospital market, and

is a vector of coefficients for level one

is a vector of variables for the

hospital in the

hospital market. The next equation represents the level two model:
(5)
Where

represents the group mean for the outcome variable, making the dependent variable

a variation around the average;
of level two variables in the

is a vector of coefficients for level two variables;

is a vector

hospital market. Equation 5 indicates that the intercept term of

the linear regression is actually a random variable that is explained by group-level variables, and
that the group-level variables will vary randomly from one group to the next. A third equation is
often added to hierarchical linear models:
(6)
Where

represents coefficients for level one variables that depend on level two variables;

represents a vector of coefficients for interaction between levels one and two; and

and

are random, normally-distributed error terms. This final equation indicates that the parameter
estimates will vary from one group to the next in addition to the intercept estimate. This
method will not be employed in the present study. This means that the effect of all group
variables on individual variables is assumed to be the same across all groups. Finally,

in

Equation 3 represents a vector of terms that are interaction terms between level one and level
two variables, and

is the corresponding vector of coefficients. Equation 3 can be divided into

random effects and fixed effects: the error term
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is a random effect and

represents the fixed effects of the deterministic part of the model. From this general form,
models addressing different aspects of the present study’s questions can be defined in terms of
the specific variables included in

,

, and

.

The models for both quality outcome variables and cost variables could fall into one of
two general categories. On the one hand, they could attempt to conform to various
economically-derived production functions applied to hospitals. On the other hand, they could
use an ad-hoc, intuition-based combination of variables derived from insights from previous
research. All of the models in the present study will opt for the second choice, and the reason
for this decision has two parts. First, the data described above does not translate especially well
to the typical conception of a production function that depicts changes in inputs leading to
changes in output. For example, many of the hospitals in each group are of a similar size, so
comparing individual hospital’s inputs and outputs to create a composite “representative
hospital” might not yield an interpretable function. Second, none of these approaches accounts
for some of the variables that are of interest in the present study, namely managed care market
competitiveness and population demographics. For these reasons, the functional specification
of all models that follow will not necessarily be based on axioms of profit maximization, but
rather attempt to show where relationships exist that may not conform to strict economic
intuition.
The specific variables that are included in each variation will be defined in the results
section below, but in general, all variables will address the three key features of any healthcare
system: access to, provision of, and financing of healthcare. The individual-level vector

will

include a dummy variable that differentiates specialty and general hospitals and some collection
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of variables that could indicate what factors are driving differences between individual hospitals.
These variables will attempt to answer how healthcare is provided, and in some sense will
address the supply side of the market for specialty services. The market-level vector

will

generally attempt to address issues of access to care and financing of care. Access to and
financing of care will be represented by various demographic variables and data regarding the
market structure of managed care health insurance plans. Additionally, some adjustment will be
included to attempt to control for differences in the level of health between markets. The
aspects of access and financing taken together with underlying health of the population create
some conception of the demand side of the market. The interaction vector

begins to indicate

how the demand and supply sides interact and influence each other. Although this analysis
makes no claims to present interactions of production function-derived supply curves and utility
function-derived demand curves, it still attempts to represent interactions of supply and
demand sides of the market for hospital services in the provision of cardiac procedures.
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4

Results and Discussion

Implications of the Econometric Analysis
The neoclassical model of specialty service lines comes to the conclusion that specialty
hospitals are economically successful for two reasons: higher quality outcomes for the patients
they serve and lower costs of production in comparison to their general hospital competitors.
The main driver of higher quality is identified as the ability of specialty hospitals to devote more
resources to their patients in the form of more advanced technology and more nurses per
patient. The main driver of lower cost in specialty service lines is argued to be their unique
ability to exploit economies of scale; while general hospitals are hamstrung by diseconomies of
scope associated with providing a wide variety of services. The applicability of these claims to
the sample of hospitals providing cardiac care to Medicare patients will be examined using the
data and methods described above.
Quality of the Product
The descriptive statistics above indicate that there is in fact a statistically significant
difference between specialty hospitals and their general hospital competitors in two key quality
measures: 30-day coronary mortality rate (mean difference 0.69%,
coronary readmission rate (mean difference 1.23%,

) and 30-day

). Both of these indicators measure

the outcome of an individual admitted to the hospital in question with either heart failure or an
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acute myocardial infarction. For both of the indicators, lower rates indicate better outcomes
and therefore higher quality. Another test, the independent samples

test confirms that

significant quality differences do exist, and the results of this test are presented in table 3. The
independent sample

test indicates that there is in fact a statistically significant difference

between the quality of care in specialty and general hospitals, and this result holds whether or
not the variance of individual quality is equal between specialty and general hospitals. The
results of the Levene’s test do indicate that the variance between the two groups are equal in
this case. Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the linear facility-level model, the linear facilityand market-level model, and the hierarchical linear model. One interesting meta-result in both
tables 4 and 5 is that for facility- and market-level variables, the linear model and hierarchical
model yield identical parameter estimates and significance levels, indicating that in this case,
allowing the intercept terms to vary randomly from one market to the next does not add any
accuracy or stability to the linear facility-and-market model. Furthermore, OLS estimation and
maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters did not produce different results.
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Table 3: Independent Samples Test for Quality Variables
Levene's Test
t-test for Equality of Means
Quality Variable
Mean
Sig. (2F
Sig.
t statistic
Difference
tailed)
1.886
.062
=σ²
30-Day Coronary
.800
.373
0.69%
Mortality Rate
2.200
.032
≠σ²
2.995
.003
=σ²
30-Day Coronary
.004
.950
1.23%
Readmission Rate
2.852
.007
≠σ²
“=σ²” indicates that the statistic applies when equal variances are assumed between the two groups;
“≠σ²” indicates that the statistic applies when unequal variances are assumed.
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Table 4: Comparison of Methods for 30-Day Coronary Mortality Rate
Linear, Facility
Linear, Facility
Only
and Market
̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅=.435
Independent Variables
Intercept
Specialty Indicator
Cardiac Market Share
Nurse to Patient Ratio
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient Ratio
Capital per Patient (thousands of dollars)
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient
Log of ED Visits not leading to an inpatient
stay
Log of Inpatient Surgeries
Services
Services * CON Law Indicator
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points)
MCO HHI (hundreds of points)
Cardiac Patient HHI * MCO HHI
Advantage Penetration Rate
MCO HHI * Advantage Penetration Rate
Log of Total Medicare Enrollees
Advantage Pen Rate * Log of Total Medicare
Enrollees
FQHCs
Coronary Death Rate
Over 65 Poverty Rate (per 100,000)
Median Age

̂
18.665
-4.004
0.033
-0.085
0.243
-0.626
0.823

Sig.
0.000
0.002
0.008
0.650
0.524
0.001
0.002

0.253

̂

HLM
̂

31.626
-2.930
-0.058
-0.201
-0.624
0.829

Sig.
0.002
0.001
0.745
0.398
0.000
0.001

31.626
-2.930
-0.058
-0.201
-0.624
0.829

Sig.
0.002
0.001
0.745
0.398
0.000
0.001

0.424

-

-

-

-

-0.970
0.026
-

0.006
0.448
-

-0.041
0.204
0.087
-0.006
-0.440
0.002
-1.775

0.011
0.049
0.009
0.000
0.057
0.182
0.003

-0.041
0.204
0.087
-0.006
-0.440
0.002
-1.775

0.011
0.049
0.009
0.000
0.057
0.182
0.003

-

-

0.028

0.064

0.028

0.064

-

-

-0.011
0.009
0.000
0.008

0.232
0.379
0.181
0.099

-0.011
0.009
0.000
0.008

0.232
0.379
0.181
0.099
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Thirty-day mortality rate.
The facility-level linear model in table 4 yield a few striking results. First, it confirms that
there is indeed a difference in the 30-day mortality rate between specialty and general hospitals
when other variables are controlled for. Cardiac market share is a significant driver of quality. A
larger share of the cardiac surgery market relates to a .03% higher rate of mortality (

).

This finding addresses the claims in Schneider et.al. that higher patient volumes in a focused
number of procedures can improve quality—as measured by the mortality rate, this does not
seem to be the case. The linear model also show that while the nurse-to-patient ratio is not a
significant driver of quality in either group of hospitals, the amount of capital used to care for
the average patient will reduce the hospital’s mortality rate. An increase of $1000 in capital per
patient correlates with a decrease in the 30-day mortality rate of .626% (
coefficient on the interaction term Specialty Indicator

). However, the

Capital per Patient indicates that this

effect is totally reversed in specialty hospitals. The same increase of $1000 in capital per patient
actually correlates with an increase in the 30-day mortality rate of .82% (
net effect an increase of .2%.The number of services that the hospital provides (

) making the
) does

not appear to have any significant effect on quality. Finally, the number of patients admitted to
the emergency room in the hospital does not appear to have an effect on either quality
measure. The results of the facility-level individual model does identify a few important drivers
of quality in specialty and general hospitals.
The addition of hospital market and insurance market variables lead to interesting
results. The interaction term Services

CON Law Indicator indicates that the number of

services a hospital offers will only affect quality in markets where there is a legal barrier
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preventing hospitals from adding new services. It indicates that each additional service will
correspond to a .041% lower mortality rate (

) in those hospitals facing expansion

regulations. Both hospital and insurance markets that are more concentrated have higher
mortality rates. For example, an increase of 100 points in the HHI measurement of the cardiac
patient market relates to an increased mortality rate of .204% (

) in the individual

hospital; likewise, an increase of 100 in the managed care market HHI corresponds to an
increase of .087% (

). The interaction term Cardiac Patient HHI MCO HHI indicates that

simultaneous changes in the same direction in both markets would dampen this effect. The two
100-point increases described above would correspond to a .012% lower mortality rate (
), leaving the net effect to be a mortality rate that is .279% higher. Furthermore, a higher
prevalence of Medicare Advantage plans reduces the average coronary mortality rate, though
the marginal increase in Advantage enrollment associated with an increase in total Medicare
enrollment reduces this effect according to the parameter Advantage Penetration Rate Log of
Medicare Enrollment. The coefficient on this parameter is .028 (

), which indicates that

the proportion of a one percent increase in Medicare enrollment that opts in to Medicare
Advantage correlates with a .028% higher coronary mortality rate at the individual hospital
level. This effect is statistically significant, and combining this result with the parameter on the
variable Advantage Penetration Rate (-.44, p < .07) suggests that the features of Medicare
Advantage plans that improve quality may exhibit diminishing marginal returns. Finally, the
number of people enrolled in Medicare appears to be related to a lower mortality rate at the
individual hospital level.
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Table 5: Comparison of Methods for 30-Day Coronary Readmission Rate
Linear, Facility
Linear, Facility
Only
and Market
̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅=.090
Independent Variables
Intercept
Specialty Indicator
Cardiac Market Share
Nurse to Patient Ratio
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient Ratio
Capital per Patient (thousands of dollars)
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient
Log of ED Visits not leading to an inpatient
stay
Log of Inpatient Surgeries
Services
Services * CON Law Indicator
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points)
MCO HHI (hundreds of points)
Cardiac Patient HHI * MCO HHI
Advantage Penetration Rate
MCO HHI * Advantage Penetration Rate
Log of Total Medicare Enrollees
Advantage Pen Rate * Log of Total Medicare
Enrollees
FQHCs
Coronary Death Rate
Over 65 Poverty Rate (per 100,000)
Median Age

̂
23.050
.355
-.035
.260
-.345
.008
-.048

Sig.
.000
.825
.028
.284
.482
.972
.888

.365

̂

HLM
̂

35.926
-.775
.182
-.421
-.072
.300

Sig.
.010
.528
.458
.199
.748
.348

35.926
-.775
.182
-.421
-.072
.300

Sig.
.010
.528
.458
.199
.748
.348

.373

-

-

-

-

-.473
.010
-

.293
.823
-

.040
.160
.020
-.004
-.738
.004
-1.508

.071
.259
.653
.028
.021
.030
.066

.040
.160
.020
-.004
-.738
.004
-1.508

.071
.259
.653
.028
.021
.030
.066

-

-

.046

.031

.046

.031

-

-

-.006
.005
.000
.006

.626
.731
.012
.383

-.006
.005
.000
.006

.626
.731
.012
.383
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Thirty-day readmission rate.
Table 5 presents the results of the same three models applied to the 30-day coronary
readmission rate. The first result is that there is no longer the striking and significant coefficient
on the variable Specialty Indicator, meaning that there is no significant difference between the
two groups of hospitals when other variables are taken into account. The estimate associated
with Cardiac Market Share tells the opposite story from the 30-day mortality rate. An increase
of one percent in the hospital’s cardiac market share correlates to a .035% decrease in its
readmission rate (

), indicating a quality improvement. The nurse-to-patient ratio still

remains insignificant, as do the number of services offered and the hospital’s ER volume.
Interestingly, the average amount of capital used in treating patients is not at all significant.
While the facility-level model indicates that the difference in readmission rates between
specialty and general hospitals may not be as clear as originally predicted, it does not offer
much in the way of identifying significant potential drivers behind this lack of difference.
The inclusion of market-level variables into the model begins to bring some important
motivators to light. First, the interaction term Services

CON Law Indicator indicates that the

number of services a hospital offers will only affect quality in markets where there is a legal
barrier preventing hospitals from adding new services. Each additional service relates to a .04%
higher readmission rate (

) in hospitals in regulated markets. Interestingly, the

concentration of hospital and insurance markets on their own do not have a statistically
significant relationship to the readmission rate, though acting together they do. The
simultaneous 100-point increase in both cardiac care and managed care organization HHIs
illustrated in the previous sections correlate to a .004% lower rate of readmissions (
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).The

role of Medicare Advantage seems to be playing a similar role in the readmission measure as it
does for the mortality measure: increases in Advantage penetration correspond to decrease in
hospitals’ readmission rates, though the marginal effect (Advantage Penetration Rate

Log of

Medicare Enrollment) dampens this effect in a way similar to that outlined above. Finally, the
rate of people over 65 living in poverty has no effect, and this result is statistically significant
(

), calling into question the claim that general hospitals are hampered by their missions

to provide indigent care.
The inclusion of market variables in predicting both quality measures tells a different
story from examining the facility variables alone. First of all, two facility-level variables, total
inpatient surgeries and total emergency department volume, lose their predictive value.
Secondly, although the role of insurance and hospital markets is not a straightforward one, it is
clear that the surrounding market structure makes an important impact of the quality of a
hospital’s care, and this impact is statistically significant. Concentration in the health insurance
market and the Medicare Advantage penetration rate seem to act in opposite directions. Part of
this contradiction may be explained in the definition of the variables. Data on managed care
competition specifically excludes Medicare managed care enrollees, while data on a hospital’s
coronary mortality rate covers only Medicare enrollees. Though the relationship between the
two is large and statistically significant, it may actually be reflecting an underlying relationship
not contained in the current dataset. Individual-level variables clearly have important
relationships with the quality of care, but adding market-level variables greatly aids in explaining
differences in quality. In the neoclassical development of the production of health by specialty
service lines, several key factors were identified as drivers of higher quality in specialty hospitals.
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Though there may be some significant differences at the individual facility level, the effects of
hospital and health insurance markets and regional demographics clearly have an effect, though
the precise nature of this effect remains unclear.
Costs of Production
Despite anecdotally reported advantages of specialty hospitals and the neoclassical link
between specialization and reduced cost, the descriptive statistics above do not indicate a
significant difference in average cost between specialty hospitals and their general hospital
competitors. To confirm this initial result, table 6 contains the results of an independent sample
test for equality of means of total cost for cardiac care and average cost per cardiac patient
between specialty and general hospitals. The Levene’s test indicates that the variance of cardiac
average cost is equal between specialty and general hospitals, and the test indicates that there
is not a statistically-significant difference between them. Despite the fact that there is not a
significant difference in the cost of cardiac care, the progression of models will be applied to
attempt to understand why claims might be made to the effect that specialty hospitals are
lower-cost producers. Tables 7 and 8 contain the results of these models.
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Table 6: Independent Samples Test for Average Cost
Levene's Test

t-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

Mean
Difference

Total Cardiac Care Cost
(millions of dollars)

1.231

0.270

2.753

Average Cardiac Care Cost
(thousands of dollars)

1.141

0.288

0.601

t statistic
=σ²
≠σ²
=σ²

0.341
0.400
0.453

Sig. (2-tailed)
0.734
0.691
0.652

0.589
0.558
≠σ²
“=σ²” indicates that the statistic applies when equal variances are assumed between the two groups;
“≠σ²” indicates that the statistic applies when unequal variances are assumed.
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Table 7: Comparison of Methods for Total Cost (Millions of Dollars)
Linear, Facility
Linear, Facility
Only
and Market
̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅=.569

HLM

Independent Variables

̂

Sig.

̂

Sig.

̂

Sig.

Intercept
Specialty Indicator
Nurse to Patient Ratio
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient
Ratio
Capital per Patient (thousands of
dollars)
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient

-77.587
70.589
1.083

.000
.002
.782

90.631
14.267
2.169

.001
.377
.505

91.193
16.730
2.243

.032
.277
.473

-.440

.935

-.521

.905

-2.264

.587

13.504

.000

7.743

.009

6.868

.015

-13.623

.010

-5.386

.202

-4.381

.273

Cardiac Market Share
Services

.042
2.578

.863
.000

2.957
.796

.001
.000

3.591
.801

.000
.011

Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points)

-

-

-3.887

.000

-3.778

.014

-

-

-.046

.099

-.068

.029

-

-

-2.517

.000

.083

.020

Cardiac Patient HHI * MCO HHI

-

-

.067

.011

-2.980

.004

Advantage Penetration Rate

-

-

5.124

.046

3.764

.322

-

-

-.427

.027

-.325

.263

-

-

.224

.034

.204

.202

Cardiac Market Share * Cardiac Patient
HHI
MCO HHI (hundreds of points)

Advantage Penetration Rate * Log of
Medicare Enrollment
FQHCs
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Total Cost.
Once again, the facility model on its own, shown in table 7, reveals several important
relationships. First and most noteworthy is that when these other facility characteristics are
controlled for, specialty hospitals do seem to have higher total costs of cardiac care than general
hospitals. The regressions presented in table 8 do not contain a variable for the size of the
hospital, which may seem counterintuitive at first. However, the results of the ANOVA for the
differences in means for total cost of cardiac care indicate that specialty and general hospitals is
negligible. Despite the lower overall size of specialty hospitals, they tend to be similar to general
hospitals in terms of cardiac care. As a result, the size of the facility is not deemed as variable
directly relevant to the regressions. The nurse to patient ratio does not appear to have any
relationship to total cost. Capital per patient is a significant driver of total cost: in general
hospitals, an increase in capital per patient by $1000 increases total cost by over $13 million
(

). This relationship is totally reversed in specialty hospitals, however. The same $1000

increase in capital per patient actually relates to a net decrease in total cost of $600,000
(

). Each individual hospital’s market share does not appear to have a significant

relationship with either total or average cost. The number of services the hospital offers appears
to significantly increase the total cost of cardiac care.
Adding the effects of hospital and insurance markets tells a somewhat different story,
and the OLS linear model and hierarchical linear model yield somewhat different results. The
inclusion of market factors changes the apparent effects of facility variables. To begin with,
variable Specialty Indicator is no longer significant, indicating that when market variables are
controlled for, any difference in total cost between the two become insignificant. The nurse-to52

patient ratio remains insignificant. Capital per patient still has a positive correlation with total
cost, but the reversal of this relationship for specialty hospitals disappears. Intuitively, the share
of the cardiac market that an individual hospital controls also has a positive correlation with its
total cost. As a hospital treats a larger portion of patients, it is to be expected that its total costs
will increase, even allowing for potential economies of scale or increasing returns. Finally, the
number of services the hospital offers also relates to a higher total cost of cardiac care.
At the market level, both the linear model and hierarchical model agree that higher
concentration in the cardiac care market will result in lower total costs for individual hospitals.
Though this result is counterintuitive at first, it makes sense in light of the coefficients on the
parameters Cardiac Market Share and Cardiac Market Share Cardiac Patient HHI: total costs
for the large hospitals in concentrated markets increase, but the average cost of any given
hospital decreases, and these results are statistically significant. Take for example an increase of
100 points in Cardiac Patient HHI brought on by a 10% increase in one hospital’s market share.
The parameter estimate of Cardiac Patient HHI suggests that this would lead to a decrease in
total cost of approximately $3 million (

[

but an increase in between $30 and $36 million (

]

[
[

];

]) in the average hospital,
[

]) for the hospital

whose market share increased, which yields a net increase in total cost for that hospital. Total
output shifts from the wider market to the firm that increases its output.
The concentration of the health insurance market and its interaction with the hospital
market also provide interesting results. In the linear model, concentrated health insurance
markets seem to indicate lower total cardiac care costs. This makes intuitive sense, as managed
care organizations do have influence over how hospitals will provide care to patients through
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their reimbursement strategies, and these effects should not be radically different between
populations covered by private insurance and populations covered by Medicare. Essentially, cost
containments put into place by private insurance companies will have spillover effects on the
types of care provided to Medicare patients, and these effects should be more pronounced in
concentrated markets. The interaction term Cardiac Patient HHI

MCO HHI indicates that

concentrated hospital markets with slightly counteract this effect. Considering the same two
parameters in the hierarchical linear model shows opposite results, however: managed care
market concentration only acts to reduce total cost in conjunction with hospital market
conditions; on its own, it actually increases total cost. A further interesting turn in the managed
care market is the role of Medicare Advantage. In the linear model, Medicare Advantage
appears to increase costs, though at a decreasing rate for the marginal increase in Advantage
enrollment associated with an increase in total Medicare enrollment. In the hierarchical model,
it has no significant effect.

54

Table 8: Comparison of Methods for Average Cost (Thousands of Dollars)
Linear, Facility
Linear, Facility
Only
and Market
HLM
̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅=.300
Independent Variables

̂

Sig.

̂

Sig.

̂

Sig.

Intercept

-9.940

0.281

10.192

0.084

9.944

0.109

Specialty Indicator
Cardiac Average Length of Stay

3.150
2.087

0.419
0.036

3.538
2.406

0.314
0.006

3.581
-0.262

0.342
0.699

Nurse to Patient Ratio
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient
Ratio
Capital per Patient (thousands of
dollars)
Specialty Indicator * Capital per
Patient
Cardiac Market Share

-0.086

0.902

-0.273

0.685

0.458

0.616

0.043

0.964

0.509

0.574

1.895

0.003

2.011

0.003

1.913

0.002

-1.217

0.170

-1.036

0.270

-1.252

0.153

-0.279

0.062

-0.067

0.122

-0.285

0.045

-0.502

0.007

Log of Inpatient Surgeries

1.738

0.140

-

-

-

-

Services
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of
points)
Cardiac Market Share * Cardiac
Patient HHI
Advantage Penetration Rate
Advantage Pen Rate * Log of Total
Medicare Enrollees

-0.109

0.425

-0.055

0.241

-0.001

0.991

-

-

-0.512

0.001

0.011

0.019

-

-

0.012

0.009

0.843

0.058

-

-

0.860

0.021

-0.057

0.075

-

-

-0.059

0.029

2.424

0.014
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Average Cost.
The facility level model outlined in table 8 is able to identify a handful of statistically
significant relationships and address some of the claims raised in the neoclassical model. First,
the Specialty Indicator variable is not significant, so there is no difference in average cost per
patient when other facility variables are controlled for. Average length of stay is correlated with
higher average costs, which reflects a clear clinical relationship. Patients that have longer stays
in the hospital generally have more complicated cases, so an increase in average cost for these
patients is to be expected. The nurse-to-patient ratio does not appear to have any significant
effect on average cost. This is an interesting counterintuitive result on its own, because an
increase in the nurse-to-patient ratio means that a hospital is expending more resources in
treating the average patient. Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with the above model for
total costs. The average capital per patient is a significant driver of higher average costs, and this
relationship also makes intuitive sense. None of the other facility-level variables appear to be
significantly related to average cost.
The inclusion of market-level variables has a few interesting effects on facility-level
variables in both the linear OLS and hierarchical linear models, although neither case makes
Specialty Indicator significant. Capital per patient remains significant in the OLS linear model,
but the hierarchical linear model not only reverses the sign, but lowers the significance level.
Capital per patient does become a significant driver of lower average cost for specialty hospitals,
however, as indicated by the interaction term Specialty Indicator Capital per Patient. A further
notable result of the hierarchical linear model is that the nurse-to-patient ratio does become
significantly correlated with higher average costs only in specialty hospitals, as indicated by the
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interaction term Specialty Indicator

Nurse to Patient Ratio. Furthermore, the variable

Cardiac Market Share becomes significantly correlated with lower average costs, and this result
will be explained in more detail below. Adding market-level variables clarifies a few of the
relationships between facility-level variables and average cost.
The relationship between average cost and market conditions may be more
straightforward than that between total cost and market conditions. Most notable is that the
relationship of the private insurance market and the average cost of cardiac care is not
statistically significant. Hospital market concentration is still a major factor, although the two
estimation methods disagree on the particular nature of the effect. The OLS linear model
indicates that concentrated markets will have lower average costs, and the size of the individual
firm will accentuate this effect. The hierarchical linear model indicates that average costs will be
slightly higher for all firms in concentrated markets, but they will be much lower for the larger
firms in those markets. Returning to the above example of an increase of 100 points in cardiac
market HHI brought on by an increase of 10% in one firm’s market share, the average firm in
the market would see average costs either decrease by roughly $500 according to the OLS
model (

) or increase by roughly $800 according to the HL model (

). The firm that

increases in size would see average costs decline by between $2850 according to the OLS model
(

) and over $5000 according to the HL model (

), leading to an unambiguous net

decrease in average cost per patient. Both models suggest that Medicare Advantage will have
the effect of increasing costs, though the linear model suggests that costs will increase at a
decreasing rate as enrollment increases. On the other hand, the hierarchical linear model
indicates that lower costs can be associated with Medicare Advantage enrollment, but the
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marginal increase in Medicare Advantage enrollment associated with an increase in total
Medicare enrollment counteracts this effect.
Relationships between total cost and average cost allow for preliminary evaluations of
claims made about specialty hospitals’ ability to exploit economies of scale and general
hospitals’ inabilities to overcome diseconomies of scope. Crudely defined, economies of scale
create a situation in which average cost decreases as a result of an expansion in an existing line
of production; economies of scope have the same effect when the firm adds new but related
lines of production. Comparing the effects that certain parameters have on total and average
costs may begin to show where economies or diseconomies of scale or scope exist, if at all.
Table 9 presents the results of the hierarchical linear models for total and average cost,
displaying only those independent variables that the two models share.
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Table 9: Hierarchical Linear Models for Total and Average Costs
Total Cost (millions
of dollars)
̂
Sig.

Independent Variables

Average Cost
(thousands of dollars)
̂
Sig.

Intercept
Specialty Indicator
Nurse to Patient Ratio
Specialty Indicator * Nurse to Patient Ratio
Capital per Patient (thousands of dollars)
Specialty Indicator * Capital per Patient
Cardiac Market Share
Services
Cardiac Patient HHI (hundreds of points)

91.193997
16.730445
2.243260
-2.264987
6.868600
-4.381407
3.591233
.801333
-3.778678

.032
.277
.473
.587
.015
.273
.000
.011
.014

3.581
-0.262
0.458
1.895
-1.217
-0.279
-0.502
-0.001
0.011

0.342
0.699
0.616
0.003
0.170
0.062
0.007
0.991
0.019

Cardiac Market Share * Cardiac Patient HHI

-.068555

.029

0.843

0.058

Advantage Penetration Rate
Advantage Penetration Rate * Log of Medicare
Enrollment

3.764542

.322

-0.057

0.075

-.325250

.263

2.424

0.014
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The coefficients for each model in table 9 on the variable Cardiac Market Share seem to
indicate that there may be economies of scale to be gained in inpatient cardiac care. As market
share increases (meaning that the individual hospital is treating more patients), total cost
increases, but average cost decreases, and both of these results are statistically significant. It is
important to note, however, that this result holds for both specialty and general hospitals, so if
this economy of scale can be taken to exist, it is one that is external to individual firms—it
applies to the “industry” of heart surgery as a whole. To further support this result, a model
including the interaction term Specialty Indicator

Cardiac Market Share does not produce

meaningful statistically significant results, but rather serves to dilute the effect of the market
share variable. Another potential measure of specialty hospitals’ advantages yield different
results. While an increase in capital per patient results in increased total costs for both groups,
only specialty hospitals see a simultaneous fall in average cost. Specialty hospitals may be able
to exploit a return to capital that general hospitals are not. It is worth noting, however, that this
effect is greatly outweighed by the increase in average cost that the nurse-to-patient ratio
uniquely brings to specialty hospitals. Economies of scale cannot be conclusively proved or
disproved from these models, but these models do show that while economies of scale may
exist for heart surgery, specialty hospitals are not clearly exploiting them in a unique way that
makes them unambiguous lower-cost producers.
Economies of scope are more difficult to define and measure than economies of scale.
The closest approximation in the above models is the independent variable Services, which
measures the number of distinct service lines the hospital is certified to provide to Medicare
patients. Intuitively, general hospitals tend to have a higher number of services than specialty
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hospitals. The coefficients on this parameter do show that as the number of services offered
increases, so does the total cost of providing cardiac care, but there is no significant effect on
average cost. As a result, the economies or diseconomies of scope cannot be conclusively ruled
in or out.
Once again, there do appear to be significant differences between individual hospitals
that affect the cost of the care they provide to Medicare cardiac patients, but these facility-level
differences exist in the context of health insurance and hospital market factors that may either
work against facility-level differences or accentuate them. Hospitals in concentrated markets
consistently have higher average costs, but the prevalence of managed care in the Medicare
population may reduce this effect. Finally, although there may in fact be economies of scale
inherent in the delivery of inpatient cardiac care, it is not clear that specialty hospitals are taking
advantage of this feature in a unique way, nor is it clear that general hospitals are undercut by
the wide variety of services they provide.
Avenues of Further Research
The econometric analysis clearly has room for further investigation. One important
opportunity could be to expand the definition of specialty service lines, either procedurally or
structurally, with the aim of improving the external validity of the results. Doing so could
improve the results by both increasing the sample size and adding qualitative variety to the
members of the sample. Another potentially fruitful avenue of study would be to compare
hospital behavior in markets that have one or more specialty service lines to markets that do
not. Doing so would allow for an analysis of what market factors can be identified as being
important to the development of specialty service lines. Finally, time-series data could be used
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to examine the interactions of specialty service lines and their competitors in the context of
hospital and insurance markets. Several researchers have noted anecdotal or survey-based
relationships that change hospital behavior over time; for example Berenson, Bodenheimer, and
Pham (Specialty Service Lines: Salvos in the New Medican Arms Race 2006) or Devers, Brewster,
and Casalino (Changes in Hospital Competative Strategy 2003); but no studies have used
Medicare cost report data in combination with hospital and insurance market data to attempt to
define statistical relationships.
The existence of specialty service lines in the United States hospital system raise many
important questions about the way healthcare is provided in society and the role of physicians
in the hospital system and healthcare in general. A handful of questions are raised by
considering specialty service lines in terms of neoclassical economics: specialty hospitals are
claimed to employ product differentiation in the form of higher quality healthcare; and they
allegedly take advantage of economies of scale and avoid diseconomies of scope. Furthermore,
consumer demand is identified as the primary reason for the emergence of specialty service
lines. Insofar as these claims can be analyzed with statistical techniques, econometric results do
not provide a conclusive affirmation or disproval of these claims. Quality is not a clear thing to
measure, but any differences that may exist disappear upon the consideration of facility- and
market-level factors. Diseconomies of scope do not appear to exist for the hospitals considered
in this study, and while economies of scale do exist, it does not appear that specialty hospitals
are exploiting them in a unique way. More questions are raised when considering specialty
service lines from a public health or health system perspective, and neither the neoclassical
economics approach nor the existing body of public health research can adequately answer
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them. These wide-ranging questions generally deal with issues of how healthcare fits into
society and how physicians fit into the healthcare system. A full analysis of these questions is
beyond the scope of the present study, but the following section suggests the beginnings of a
potentially useful framework for further research.

Healthcare in Specialty Service Lines: Useful Services Produced For
Exchange
Clearly the development of the physician-owned specialty hospital is a continuation of
many important trends in the United States hospital system, but in a larger sense, it is a
microcosm of several important movements in the development of the capitalist mode of
production. Healthcare services seem to clearly fit Marx’s (1990) three-part definition of a
commodity: they are useful, they are the results of laboring activity, and their producer sells
them rather than using them immediately. Examining the healthcare that specialty service lines
provide in terms of each component of this three-part definition helps to illustrate the
motivation for the development of specialty-service lines not only in the context of the United
States’ hospital system, but also in the larger movement of the capitalist mode of production.
Two contradictory trends emerge from considering specialized healthcare in this framework:
commodification and professionalization. Both of these trends address key question about what
the emergence of specialty service lines does to healthcare and to physicians. Neither of these
trends will be explained fully here, but rather, the following sections aim to show that the
contradictory movement between the two is a fertile ground for further analysis of the issue of
specialty service lines.
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The Role of Healthcare in Society: Commodification
Consumer Demand.
The first property of a commodity laid out in the definition above is that it must be
useful, or have what Marx calls use-value. Marx’s development of the commodity in Capital
(1990) and in the Grundrisse (1993) defines use-value as the particular characteristics of a
commodity that allow it to satisfy a need or want. Applying this property to the healthcare
delivered in specialty service lines addresses the claim that specialty service lines are responding
to “consumer demand” for expensive, technologically-intensive, highly specialized treatments.
Patients can demand better health, but they have little ability to demand particular treatments
for their illnesses in an immediate sense.4 Mainstream health economics ascribes this problem
to a variety of market failures. Asymmetrical information forces patients to rely on their doctors’
recommendations; imperfect competition in the provider market distorts incentives; consumer
insensitivity to price due to insurance forces them to demand more than they would otherwise
(Santerre and Neun 2010); the biomedical model of illness and treatment conditions physicians
to look for new technologies in search of a “silver bullet” cure (Bodenheimer and Grumbach
2009). All of these explanations acknowledge that the healthcare services that are demanded
depend in a very important way on the ability of people to access services, characterized by the
market context in which providers and patients are situated. None of these explanations,
however, allow for the possibility that the only services that can be accessed are the
technologically-intensive expensive services and that this phenomenon is the result of the
pursuit of profit.
4

This does not rule out the possibility that individuals want treatments that don’t exist yet, for example a
cure for cancer. Rather, in any one episode of disease and treatment, the healthcare commodities that an
individual can choose from must already exist, whatever long-term aspirations the healthcare system may
have.
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This initial claim requires an explanation of the reasons behind hospitals’ drive to
purchase advanced technology. Several plausible explanations have been advanced in the
literature. For example, returning to the discussion of the medical arms race above, hospitals
pursue advanced technology for the high profile that comes with being on the cutting edge of
treatment, and to capture the largest possible market share. Exploring physician-hospital
relationships shows that competition between hospitals in order to attract physicians often
takes the form of acquiring new technology. All of the econometric analyses above begin to
refute the claim that capital-intensive care necessarily always results in better outcomes and
lower costs. These explanations are useful, but there is one theme tying them all together: the
pursuit of profit in the production of healthcare services. The drive for profit always spurs the
application of new technologies in the capitalist mode of production, and the particular working
out of this process in specialty-service lines must be considered briefly next.
Proletarianization of Health Services.
In the 1980s, sociologists Donald Light and Sol Levine began to describe the process of
what they call the “proletarianization of health professions.” This process is one by which
healthcare providers at all levels are put in the position of the wage laborer in the capitalist
mode of production. In order for this process to occur, the rise and dominance of
technologically-intensive healthcare must be a particular instance of the real subsumption of
labor-power to capital. At the conceptual level, the process of the real subsumption of labor to
capital begins with the replacement of human action in the three main areas of productive
activity: the tool, the transmission mechanism, and the motive power. The pursuit of profit
drives this process of replacement, and the primary way this occurs is through reducing tasks to
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smaller and less complex components that could be performed with less human intervention.
Marx’s description of this process leaves the worker in the productive process in an ancillary
position to the vast superstructure of machinery (Marx, Capital 1990), and Light and Levine
intentionally invoke this image in describing the transformation of the medical profession: “The
institutional and technical character of medical work has become so complex that it threatens to
make physicians an appendage to rather than a master of their technology” (1988, 10).
It may be difficult to rationally conceive of heart surgery as a simple task, but the
neoclassical argument laid out above makes an important case for this consideration. In
describing specialty hospital’s abilities to exploit the advantages of learning by doing, Schneider
et. al. describe a process by which a firm can improve its productive process by the repetition of
simple tasks by experienced physicians and nurses. They apply that argument that “simplicity,
repetition, experience, and homogeneity of tasks breed competence” (Schneider, et al. 2008,
12) to the production process of the hospital. In addition to the responses to the authors’
surveys, they cite numerous studies that all seem to show the same trend. General hospitals
have the potential to achieve the same decomposition of the task into its smaller components,
but so far have not been able to do so because of “incentive attenuation” (Schneider, et al.
2008, 14). In other words, because they are not profit-maximizing, they are not inclined to
follow this trend. Specialty hospitals, on the other hand, see the benefit in breaking down and
automating services to the greatest extent possible. In so far as heart surgery can be reduced to
a large number of small and simple tasks, specialty hospitals are pursuing this path with vigor.
Applying the term “proletariat” to physicians can also be problematic. The typical
Marxian conception of a proletariat class is a class of workers that have little or no control over
their working conditions and the particular character of the tasks that they do (Light and Levine
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1988), (Marx, 1844 Manuscripts 1988). In very meaningful ways, these two defining
characteristics of the proletariat do not apply to physicians. Hospital competition for specialists
gives specialists considerable say in their work environments, and the decline of managed care
in insurance has greatly decreased the use of practices like utilization reviews to influence how
they treat patients. Nonetheless, there is an important case to be made that the drive for profit
is changing the way in which care is provided. The decreases in cost associated with specialty
hospitals that is implied in the neoclassical argument and partially confirmed through
econometric analysis (specifically tables 7, 8 and 9 and their accompanying discussions) show
that when profit is the explicit goal of production, care is delivered differently. Rather than
invalidating the concept of proletarianization, the particular characteristics of the role of the
physician in providing care set up the first half of an important contradictory movement in the
commodity that is specialty service line-delivered healthcare. The second half of this
contradiction lies in the role of the physician in pursuing profit, which will be explored next.
The Role of Physicians in Healthcare: Professionalization, or the Physician as
Capitalist
In the introduction to this analysis, a quote was presented regarding the dangers of
physician-owned specialty service lines in the broader context of the United States healthcare
system:
…twenty-first century health care in the United States is becoming characterized by a
single-minded quest for profitability that is threatening traditional notions of
professionalism and community service (Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2009, 200).
This quote is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it shows that the care provided in a
specialist-driven healthcare system does not line up with the image that most people have in
mind when they think of doctors. Secondly, it shows that “traditional notions of professionalism
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and community service” are (or were) actually holding back the development of the delivery of
healthcare along the track of the capitalist mode of production.
The theoretical development that Schneider et. al. lay out above repeatedly points to
the maximization of profit in production as the single most distinctive aspect of specialty
hospitals. Whether surgeon-owners have financial accountability to provide high-quality care,
the single-minded mission of the specialty hospital gives them an administrative advantage, or
the pursuit of higher patient volumes increases physicians’ medical abilities, the pursuit of profit
absolutely shapes the way healthcare in specialty hospitals is provided, even from the
neoclassical perspective. The most noticeable way in which this occurs is in the resource
intensity of, or the application of capital to, treatment discussed above. This threatens to
marginalize the role of the individual physician. Rather than allowing for this marginalization,
physician ownership of hospitals allows them to maintain control over their working
environment and the particular character of the treatments they provide. In short, ownership
allows physicians to uphold the professional character of the delivery of healthcare.
Physician-owners of specialty service lines own both the profit created by their venture
as a whole and the value of their labor-power paid to them as a wage or salary. In this sense,
they have the potential to actually live up to Marx’s strict conception of the capitalist: on the
one hand, their labor-power is reproduced by the wage that they are paid; while on the other
hand, they still have the ability to attend to the constant production of profit as the owners of
the specialty service line. Physician ownership of specialty service lines allows physicians to
simultaneously push away and embrace the trend of technologically-intensive specialty
treatment. Where the applications of technology to medical treatment tends to minimize the
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role of the physician’s personal style in performing surgery, physician ownership allows
physicians to choose which technologies to apply and which to disregard. Limiting the
application of technology allows physicians to maintain control of their role in production
process.
This immediately draws a comparison with the pre-capitalist craft producer; however,
this comparison is not entirely appropriate. Where craft production is characterized by limited
production in accordance with professional standards, specialty service line production of
healthcare still fits the unlimited nature of capitalist production, and professional standards and
community service are subordinated to the pursuit of profit. This is clearer nowhere than in the
neoclassical theory of specialty service lines. The key advantages of specialized medical care are
ever-higher volumes of patients and a laser-like focus on the highest-margin procedures and
conditions. General hospitals are consistently characterized as institutions hampered by the
mission of providing care to populations that are less able to pay or that need more routine,
lower-profit treatments. While there are elements of craft production that are relevant to
specialized healthcare, it is clear that specialized healthcare does not exist as a last holdout of an
older mode of production, but is rather simply an anomaly within the capitalist mode of
production.
Commodification and professionalization are clearly two trends that are opposed to
each other. These two trends are not unique to specialty service lines; indeed, Starr (The Social
Transformation of American Medicine 1984) provides an account of these trends in the larger
healthcare system in a historical context. Specialty service lines are unique, however, in that
they allow these two trends to coexist in one location—the specialty hospital—and in some
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sense within one individual—the physician-owner. Specialty service lines are the dialectical
synthesis of these two opposing trends. Commodification creates a narrow channel for
consumer demand and requires that the production process be continually refined. These
features serve to define the role of healthcare in society, but they also threaten to marginalize
the role of the physician in healthcare. Professionalism, on the other hand, attempts to preserve
the central position that the physician has in the provision of healthcare. The pressures of
commodification cannot allow physicians to maintain a craft producer role, however, so the only
recourse to preserve professionalism is for physicians to act as capitalists. Doing so allows them
to take advantage of the beneficial aspects of commodification without losing their professional
character. These two opposing trends clearly have important implications for the role of
healthcare in society and the place of physicians in healthcare, although those implications are
only explored in a very preliminary way here. Any further research in specialty service lines
should account for these trends as well.
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5

Conclusion

One thing should become clear through both the econometric and conceptual analyses
above: specialty service lines exist within a wider context of the hospital market, the health
insurance market, the specific characteristics of the surrounding population, and the capitalist
mode of production as a whole. This being the case, any analysis that does not attempt to
account for all of these features will be severely hampered in its attempts to explain why
specialty service lines exist, how they provide care, and why they provide care in the specific
way that they do. Specialty service lines hold important implications not only for clinical
outcomes and cost reductions, but also for the role that healthcare plays in society as a whole,
and for the position of individual healthcare providers in providing care.
Previous studies have considered individual hospitals’ production characteristics as the
key to understanding these questions, falling back on anecdotal explanations of market trends
when the interviews and surveys fall short. One thing that all previous research seems to agree
on is that specialty service lines offer higher-quality care and reduce costs. To attempt to
examine and extend these claims, the present study employs various econometric techniques
including hierarchical linear modeling—a relative newcomer to both economics and public
health—using administrative data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, health
insurance market data from the American Medical Association, and demographic data from the
Health Resources and Services Administration in order to describe trends in terms of not only
71

individual hospital behavior, but in terms of the market factors that may affect this behavior.
While specialty service lines do appear to provide higher quality care in the population
examined in this study, it is not unambiguously clear that this quality difference is not also the
result of complex interaction of market and regional characteristics. Certainly, the resource
intensity of the care delivered in a hospital, which is generally identified as the cause of highquality care, does not play as significant a role as is typically theorized. Furthermore, there is
little reason to believe that specialty service lines are lower-cost producers than their general
hospital competitors. Where economies of scale exist, they are not unique to specialty hospitals.
Market characteristics do have a significant impact on the cost structure of the hospital, and
these market structures create constraints within which individual hospitals operate. Although
there is certainly a wide range of improvements that can be made to the econometric analysis, it
is clear that the pursuit of profit in healthcare causes important changes to the way healthcare
is provided. Certainly there are important insights to be gained in the analysis of specialty
service lines from a neoclassical economics or public health perspective. However, doing so
without accounting for larger trends is only doing part of the work. Thus, a greater perspective is
able to yield more comprehensible and interesting results not only in econometric analysis, but
also in allowing for a dialectical approach for understanding specialty service lines in the United
States hospital system.

72

Bibliography
American Medical Association. "Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study in U.S.
Markets." Journal of the American Medical Association, 2007: 1-46.
Anderson, Gerard F., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey, and Varduhi Petrosyan. "It's the Prices,
Stupid: Why the United States is so Different from Other Countries." Health Affairs,
2003: 89-105.
Berenson, Robert A., Thomas Bodenheimer, and Hoangmai H. Pham. "Specialty Service Lines:
Salvos in the New Medican Arms Race." Health Affairs, 2006: W337-W343.
Bodenheimer, Thomas S, and Kevin Grumbach. Understanding Health Policy: a Clinical
Approach. 5th Edition. New York: McGraw Hill Medical, 2009.
Brookler, Katie, Jennifer Rothkopf, Sherri Ahmadi, and Michael Sajovetz. "Emergency Room and
Hospital Use for Medicaid Clients Cared for by Federally-Qualified Health Centers vs.
Private Provider Care." Health Affaris, June (Forthcoming) 2011.
Cowing, Thomas G., and Alphonse G. Holtmann. "Multiproduct Short-Run Hospital Cost
Functions: Emperical Evidence and Policy Implications." Southern Economic Journal
(Southern Economic Association) 49, no. 3 (January 1983): 637-653.
Devers, Kelly, Linda Brewster, and Lawrence Casalino. "Changes in Hospital Competative
Strategy: A New Medical Arms Race?" Health Services Research 38, no. 1p2 (February
2003): 447-469.
Diez-Roux, Ana V. "Multilevel Analysis in Public Health Research." Annual Review of Public
Health, no. 21 (2000): 171-193.
Dorfman, Robert, and Peter Steiner. "Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality." The American
Economic Review (American Economic Association) 44, no. 5 (December 1954): 826-836.
Dranove, David, Mark Shanley, and William White. "Price Competition in Hopital Markets: the
Switch from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven Competiton." Journal of Law and Economics
(The University of Chicago Press) 36, no. 1 (April 1993): 179-204.
73

Ginsburg, Paul B., and Joy M. Grossman. "When the Price Isn't Right: How Inadvertant Payment
Incentives Drive Medical Care." Health Affairs, 2005: 376-384.
Government Accountability Office. Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, Services Provided,
and Financial Performance. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability
Office, 2003b.
Government Accountability Office. Specialty Hospitals: Information on National Market Share,
Physician Ownership, and Patients Served. Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Accountability Office, 2003a.
Government Accountability Office. Specialty Hospitals: Information on Potential New Facilities.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2005.
Hox, J. J. Applied Multilevel Analysis. Amsterdam: TT-Publikaties, 1995.
Lake, Timothy, Kelly Devers, Linda Brewster, and Lawrence Casalino. "Something Old, Something
New: Recent Developments in Hospital-Physician Relationships." Health Services
Research, 2003: 471-488.
Light, Donald, and Sol Levine. "The Changing Character of the Medical Profession: A Theoretical
Overview." The Milbank Quarterly (Blackwell Publishing) 66 (1988): 10-32.
Marmot, Michael. "Social Determinants of Health Inequalities." The Lancet, 2005: 1099-1104.
Marx, Karl. Capital: the Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Ben Fowkes. Vol. I. III vols.
London: Penguin Books, 1990.
—. Economic and Philosophic Mansucripts of 1844. Translated by Martin Milligan. Amherst, New
York: Prometheus Books, 1988.
—. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Martin Nicolaus.
London: Penguin Books, 1993.
McGuire, Thomas G. "Physician Agency." In Handbook of Health Economics, edited by Anthony J.
Culyer, & Joseph P. Newhouse, 461-536. Amsterdam: Elvesier, 2000.
Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and
Data Analysis Methods. 2nd. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 2006.
Rice, Thomas. The Economics of Health Reconsidered. 2nd. Chicago: Heatlh Administration Press,
2003.

74

Santerre, Rexford E., and Stephen P. Neun. Health Economics: Theory, Insights, and Industry
Studies. 5th. Mason, Ohio: South-Western CENGAGE Learning, 2010.
Schneider, John E., Thomas R. Miller, Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Michael A. Morrisey, Bennet A. Zelner,
and Pengxiang Li. "The Economics of Sepcialty Hospitals." Medical Care Research and
Review 65, no. 5 (June 2008): 531-553.
Starr, Paul. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
Twisk, Jos W. R. Applied Multilevel Analysis: A Practical Guide. New York: Cambrdige University
Press, 2006.
Varian, Hal. Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.

75

Appendices
Appendix A: Glossary of Variables
Variable
Total Beds
Total Inpatients

All Patient Market Share

Cardiac Inpatients

Cardiac Patients Market
Share

Total Salary Cost
Total Non-Salary Cost
Total Cost
Total Nurses
Nurse to Patient Ratio
Capital per Patient

Definition
The number of beds that the hospital has available for shortterm acute care. Excludes skilled nursing facility (SNF) and swing
beds
The number of patients admitted to the hospital for any
inpatient treatment
The number of patients treated at the individual hospital divided
by the number of patients treated by all hospitals in the market.
Although this variable has some market context, it is considered
an individual level variable because it can be taken to represent
total output
The number of patients admitted to the hospital for treatment
of a cardiac condition, as defined by the DRG into which their
treatment falls
The number of cardiac patients at the individual hospital divided
by the total number of cardiac inpatients treated by all hospitals
in the market. Although this variable has some market context,
it is considered an individual level variable because it can be
taken to represent cardiac care output
The total amount spent on all salaries and wages in the hospital
for all departments
The total amount spent on all inputs other than labor in the
hospital for all departments
The sum of total salary and non-salary cost
The total number of full-time equivalent (FTE) licensed practical
nurses (LPNs) and registered nurses (RNs) on the hospital staff
The number of total nurses on staff divided by the hospital’s
average daily census; this measures the number of FTE nurses
that could care for a patient on any given day
The total non-salary cost divided by the total number of
inpatients served
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Variable
Cardiac Revenue
Cardiac Cost
Cardiac Average Length of
Stay
ED Visits not Leading to an
Inpatient Stay
Total ED visits
Inpatient Surgeries
Outpatient Surgeries
All Surgeries
Services
30-Day Coronary Mortality
Rate* ***
30-Day Coronary
Readmission Rate
Cardiac Average Cost
Cardiac Average Charge
Cardiac Inpatient HHI

All Inpatient HHI

MCO HHI

Medicare Advantage Plan
Penetration Rate

Definition
The total amount of revenue the hospital received from
Medicare (including Advantage plan reimbursement) for cardiac
care
The total cost the hospital reported for cardiac care provided to
Medicare patients
The average number of days between admission and discharge
for cardiac care
The total number of admissions to the hospital’s emergency
room or trauma center that did not result in an inpatient stay
The total number of admissions to the hospital’s emergency
room or trauma center whether they led to an inpatient
admission or not
The total number of surgeries requiring hospitalization
performed for all DRGs in the hospital
The total number of surgeries not requiring hospitalization
performed for all DRGs in the hospital
The sum of inpatient surgeries and outpatient surgeries
The number of distinct service lines the hospital is certified to
provide to Medicare clients
The total number of patients that are admitted to the hospital
with either heart failure or acute myocardial infarction that die
within thirty days
The total number of patients that are admitted to the hospital
with either heart failure or acute myocardial infarction that are
admitted to any hospital within thirty days
The average cost per Medicare patient for a cardiac procedure
The amount that the hospital billed Medicare for cardiac
treatment
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the hospital market for
cardiac patients; the sum of the squares of individual hospitals’
cardiac market shares
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the hospital market for total
inpatient; the sum of the squares of individual hospitals’ total
inpatient market shares
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the market for managed care
products, including HMOs and PPOs; the sum of the squares of
individual insurance companies’ market shares, where a market
share is defined as the number of people enrolled in a plan
divided by the total number of people not enrolled in Medicare
or Medicaid
The total number of people enrolled in a Medicare Advantage
managed care organization divided by the total number of
people enrolled in Medicare
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Variable
Medicare Enrollees
FQHCs
Coronary Death Rate

Over 65 Poverty Rate
Median Age
CON Law Indicator

Definition
The total number of people enrolled in Medicare
The number of federally-qualified health centers in the market
The total number of people who died from reported causes of
cerebrovascular disease, ischemic heart disease, or other
cardiovascular diseases, per 100,000 people in the market
The number of people in the market over the age of 65 with
incomes below the federal poverty level per 100,000 people in
the market
The median age of individuals in the market
A dummy variable to indicate whether the market has
regulations that require hospitals to provide justification to for
the construction of new facilities or expansion of services
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